Cooperators and reciprocators

A within-subject analysis of pro-social behavior

Aurelie Dariel, Nikos Nikiforakis

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We perform a within-subject analysis of pro-social behavior in the public-good and gift-exchange game. We find that participants classified as cooperators in the public-good game tend to reciprocate higher wages in the gift-exchange game with higher levels of effort. Non-cooperators do not exhibit such tendency. Both types offer similar wages. •We present a within-subject analysis of pro-social behavior.•Subjects play a public-good and a gift-exchange game.•Cooperators reciprocate higher wages, but not non-cooperators.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)163-166
    Number of pages4
    JournalEconomics Letters
    Volume122
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Feb 1 2014

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    Wages
    Prosocial behavior
    Gift exchange

    Keywords

    • Gift-exchange game
    • Lab experiments
    • Public-good game
    • Social preferences

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Finance

    Cite this

    Cooperators and reciprocators : A within-subject analysis of pro-social behavior. / Dariel, Aurelie; Nikiforakis, Nikos.

    In: Economics Letters, Vol. 122, No. 2, 01.02.2014, p. 163-166.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Dariel, Aurelie ; Nikiforakis, Nikos. / Cooperators and reciprocators : A within-subject analysis of pro-social behavior. In: Economics Letters. 2014 ; Vol. 122, No. 2. pp. 163-166.
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