Cooperators and reciprocators: A within-subject analysis of pro-social behavior

Aurelie Dariel, Nikos Nikiforakis

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We perform a within-subject analysis of pro-social behavior in the public-good and gift-exchange game. We find that participants classified as cooperators in the public-good game tend to reciprocate higher wages in the gift-exchange game with higher levels of effort. Non-cooperators do not exhibit such tendency. Both types offer similar wages. •We present a within-subject analysis of pro-social behavior.•Subjects play a public-good and a gift-exchange game.•Cooperators reciprocate higher wages, but not non-cooperators.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)163-166
Number of pages4
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume122
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 1 2014

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Wages
Prosocial behavior
Gift exchange

Keywords

  • Gift-exchange game
  • Lab experiments
  • Public-good game
  • Social preferences

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

Cite this

Cooperators and reciprocators : A within-subject analysis of pro-social behavior. / Dariel, Aurelie; Nikiforakis, Nikos.

In: Economics Letters, Vol. 122, No. 2, 01.02.2014, p. 163-166.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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