Cooperative mean-field type games

Abdoul Karim Cissé, Tembine Hamidou

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

In the standard formulation of a game, a player's payoff function depends on the states and actions of all the players. Yet, real world applications suggest to consider also a functional of the probability measure of states and actions of all the players. In this paper, we consider cooperative mean-field type games in which the state dynamics and the payoffs depend not only on the state and actions but also on their probability measure. We establish stochastic maximum principle and provide a time-dependent payoff allocation procedure for coalitions. The allocated payoff considers not only fairness property but also the cost of making the coalition. Finally, time consistency and subgame perfectness solution concept equations are established.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication19th IFAC World Congress IFAC 2014, Proceedings
PublisherIFAC Secretariat
Pages8995-9000
Number of pages6
Volume19
ISBN (Electronic)9783902823625
StatePublished - Jan 1 2014
Event19th IFAC World Congress on International Federation of Automatic Control, IFAC 2014 - Cape Town, South Africa
Duration: Aug 24 2014Aug 29 2014

Other

Other19th IFAC World Congress on International Federation of Automatic Control, IFAC 2014
CountrySouth Africa
CityCape Town
Period8/24/148/29/14

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Maximum principle
Costs

Keywords

  • Cooperation
  • Mean-field type
  • Stochastic maximum principle
  • Subgame perfection

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering

Cite this

Cissé, A. K., & Hamidou, T. (2014). Cooperative mean-field type games. In 19th IFAC World Congress IFAC 2014, Proceedings (Vol. 19, pp. 8995-9000). IFAC Secretariat.

Cooperative mean-field type games. / Cissé, Abdoul Karim; Hamidou, Tembine.

19th IFAC World Congress IFAC 2014, Proceedings. Vol. 19 IFAC Secretariat, 2014. p. 8995-9000.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Cissé, AK & Hamidou, T 2014, Cooperative mean-field type games. in 19th IFAC World Congress IFAC 2014, Proceedings. vol. 19, IFAC Secretariat, pp. 8995-9000, 19th IFAC World Congress on International Federation of Automatic Control, IFAC 2014, Cape Town, South Africa, 8/24/14.
Cissé AK, Hamidou T. Cooperative mean-field type games. In 19th IFAC World Congress IFAC 2014, Proceedings. Vol. 19. IFAC Secretariat. 2014. p. 8995-9000
Cissé, Abdoul Karim ; Hamidou, Tembine. / Cooperative mean-field type games. 19th IFAC World Congress IFAC 2014, Proceedings. Vol. 19 IFAC Secretariat, 2014. pp. 8995-9000
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