Cooperative mean-field type games

Abdoul Karim Cissé, Tembine Hamidou

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Abstract

    In the standard formulation of a game, a player's payoff function depends on the states and actions of all the players. Yet, real world applications suggest to consider also a functional of the probability measure of states and actions of all the players. In this paper, we consider cooperative mean-field type games in which the state dynamics and the payoffs depend not only on the state and actions but also on their probability measure. We establish stochastic maximum principle and provide a time-dependent payoff allocation procedure for coalitions. The allocated payoff considers not only fairness property but also the cost of making the coalition. Finally, time consistency and subgame perfectness solution concept equations are established.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publication19th IFAC World Congress IFAC 2014, Proceedings
    PublisherIFAC Secretariat
    Pages8995-9000
    Number of pages6
    Volume19
    ISBN (Electronic)9783902823625
    StatePublished - Jan 1 2014
    Event19th IFAC World Congress on International Federation of Automatic Control, IFAC 2014 - Cape Town, South Africa
    Duration: Aug 24 2014Aug 29 2014

    Other

    Other19th IFAC World Congress on International Federation of Automatic Control, IFAC 2014
    CountrySouth Africa
    CityCape Town
    Period8/24/148/29/14

    Fingerprint

    Maximum principle
    Costs

    Keywords

    • Cooperation
    • Mean-field type
    • Stochastic maximum principle
    • Subgame perfection

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Control and Systems Engineering

    Cite this

    Cissé, A. K., & Hamidou, T. (2014). Cooperative mean-field type games. In 19th IFAC World Congress IFAC 2014, Proceedings (Vol. 19, pp. 8995-9000). IFAC Secretariat.

    Cooperative mean-field type games. / Cissé, Abdoul Karim; Hamidou, Tembine.

    19th IFAC World Congress IFAC 2014, Proceedings. Vol. 19 IFAC Secretariat, 2014. p. 8995-9000.

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Cissé, AK & Hamidou, T 2014, Cooperative mean-field type games. in 19th IFAC World Congress IFAC 2014, Proceedings. vol. 19, IFAC Secretariat, pp. 8995-9000, 19th IFAC World Congress on International Federation of Automatic Control, IFAC 2014, Cape Town, South Africa, 8/24/14.
    Cissé AK, Hamidou T. Cooperative mean-field type games. In 19th IFAC World Congress IFAC 2014, Proceedings. Vol. 19. IFAC Secretariat. 2014. p. 8995-9000
    Cissé, Abdoul Karim ; Hamidou, Tembine. / Cooperative mean-field type games. 19th IFAC World Congress IFAC 2014, Proceedings. Vol. 19 IFAC Secretariat, 2014. pp. 8995-9000
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