Cooperative diversity as a dynamic game with incomplete information

Sintayehu Dehnie, Nasir Memon

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Cooperative diversity protocols are designed with the assumption that terminals always help each other in a socially efficient manner. This assumption may not be valid in commercial wireless networks where terminals may misbehave for selfish or malicious intentions. The presence of misbehaving terminals creates a social-dilemma where terminals exhibit uncertainty about the cooperative behavior of other terminals in the network. Cooperation in social-dilemma is characterized by a sub-optimal Nash equilibrium where wireless terminals opt out of cooperation. Hence, without establishing a mechanism to detect and mitigates effects of misbehavior, it is difficult to maintain a socially optimal cooperation. In this paper, we analyze effects of misbehavior based on game theoretic approaches. We show using evolutionary game theory, the permeation of selfish behavior in cooperative diversity. Our main goal is to design a mechanism that would enable wireless terminals to select reliable partners in the presence of uncertainty. To this end, we characterize cooperative diversity within the framework of a dynamic game with incomplete information. We introduce a reputation mechanism which would lead to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2008 IEEE Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2008 - Assuring Mission Success
DOIs
StatePublished - 2008
Event2008 IEEE Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2008 - Assuring Mission Success - Washington, DC, United States
Duration: Nov 17 2008Nov 19 2008

Other

Other2008 IEEE Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2008 - Assuring Mission Success
CountryUnited States
CityWashington, DC
Period11/17/0811/19/08

Fingerprint

Game theory
Permeation
Wireless networks
Network protocols
Uncertainty

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Dehnie, S., & Memon, N. (2008). Cooperative diversity as a dynamic game with incomplete information. In 2008 IEEE Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2008 - Assuring Mission Success [4753035] https://doi.org/10.1109/MILCOM.2008.4753035

Cooperative diversity as a dynamic game with incomplete information. / Dehnie, Sintayehu; Memon, Nasir.

2008 IEEE Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2008 - Assuring Mission Success. 2008. 4753035.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Dehnie, S & Memon, N 2008, Cooperative diversity as a dynamic game with incomplete information. in 2008 IEEE Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2008 - Assuring Mission Success., 4753035, 2008 IEEE Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2008 - Assuring Mission Success, Washington, DC, United States, 11/17/08. https://doi.org/10.1109/MILCOM.2008.4753035
Dehnie S, Memon N. Cooperative diversity as a dynamic game with incomplete information. In 2008 IEEE Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2008 - Assuring Mission Success. 2008. 4753035 https://doi.org/10.1109/MILCOM.2008.4753035
Dehnie, Sintayehu ; Memon, Nasir. / Cooperative diversity as a dynamic game with incomplete information. 2008 IEEE Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2008 - Assuring Mission Success. 2008.
@inproceedings{becfd07acd5c4e86bcb9053c2c7356c1,
title = "Cooperative diversity as a dynamic game with incomplete information",
abstract = "Cooperative diversity protocols are designed with the assumption that terminals always help each other in a socially efficient manner. This assumption may not be valid in commercial wireless networks where terminals may misbehave for selfish or malicious intentions. The presence of misbehaving terminals creates a social-dilemma where terminals exhibit uncertainty about the cooperative behavior of other terminals in the network. Cooperation in social-dilemma is characterized by a sub-optimal Nash equilibrium where wireless terminals opt out of cooperation. Hence, without establishing a mechanism to detect and mitigates effects of misbehavior, it is difficult to maintain a socially optimal cooperation. In this paper, we analyze effects of misbehavior based on game theoretic approaches. We show using evolutionary game theory, the permeation of selfish behavior in cooperative diversity. Our main goal is to design a mechanism that would enable wireless terminals to select reliable partners in the presence of uncertainty. To this end, we characterize cooperative diversity within the framework of a dynamic game with incomplete information. We introduce a reputation mechanism which would lead to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.",
author = "Sintayehu Dehnie and Nasir Memon",
year = "2008",
doi = "10.1109/MILCOM.2008.4753035",
language = "English (US)",
isbn = "9781424426775",
booktitle = "2008 IEEE Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2008 - Assuring Mission Success",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Cooperative diversity as a dynamic game with incomplete information

AU - Dehnie, Sintayehu

AU - Memon, Nasir

PY - 2008

Y1 - 2008

N2 - Cooperative diversity protocols are designed with the assumption that terminals always help each other in a socially efficient manner. This assumption may not be valid in commercial wireless networks where terminals may misbehave for selfish or malicious intentions. The presence of misbehaving terminals creates a social-dilemma where terminals exhibit uncertainty about the cooperative behavior of other terminals in the network. Cooperation in social-dilemma is characterized by a sub-optimal Nash equilibrium where wireless terminals opt out of cooperation. Hence, without establishing a mechanism to detect and mitigates effects of misbehavior, it is difficult to maintain a socially optimal cooperation. In this paper, we analyze effects of misbehavior based on game theoretic approaches. We show using evolutionary game theory, the permeation of selfish behavior in cooperative diversity. Our main goal is to design a mechanism that would enable wireless terminals to select reliable partners in the presence of uncertainty. To this end, we characterize cooperative diversity within the framework of a dynamic game with incomplete information. We introduce a reputation mechanism which would lead to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.

AB - Cooperative diversity protocols are designed with the assumption that terminals always help each other in a socially efficient manner. This assumption may not be valid in commercial wireless networks where terminals may misbehave for selfish or malicious intentions. The presence of misbehaving terminals creates a social-dilemma where terminals exhibit uncertainty about the cooperative behavior of other terminals in the network. Cooperation in social-dilemma is characterized by a sub-optimal Nash equilibrium where wireless terminals opt out of cooperation. Hence, without establishing a mechanism to detect and mitigates effects of misbehavior, it is difficult to maintain a socially optimal cooperation. In this paper, we analyze effects of misbehavior based on game theoretic approaches. We show using evolutionary game theory, the permeation of selfish behavior in cooperative diversity. Our main goal is to design a mechanism that would enable wireless terminals to select reliable partners in the presence of uncertainty. To this end, we characterize cooperative diversity within the framework of a dynamic game with incomplete information. We introduce a reputation mechanism which would lead to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=78650759692&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=78650759692&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1109/MILCOM.2008.4753035

DO - 10.1109/MILCOM.2008.4753035

M3 - Conference contribution

SN - 9781424426775

BT - 2008 IEEE Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2008 - Assuring Mission Success

ER -