Cooperative diversity as a dynamic game with incomplete information

Sintayehu Dehnie, Nasir Memon

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Abstract

    Cooperative diversity protocols are designed with the assumption that terminals always help each other in a socially efficient manner. This assumption may not be valid in commercial wireless networks where terminals may misbehave for selfish or malicious intentions. The presence of misbehaving terminals creates a social-dilemma where terminals exhibit uncertainty about the cooperative behavior of other terminals in the network. Cooperation in social-dilemma is characterized by a sub-optimal Nash equilibrium where wireless terminals opt out of cooperation. Hence, without establishing a mechanism to detect and mitigates effects of misbehavior, it is difficult to maintain a socially optimal cooperation. In this paper, we analyze effects of misbehavior based on game theoretic approaches. We show using evolutionary game theory, the permeation of selfish behavior in cooperative diversity. Our main goal is to design a mechanism that would enable wireless terminals to select reliable partners in the presence of uncertainty. To this end, we characterize cooperative diversity within the framework of a dynamic game with incomplete information. We introduce a reputation mechanism which would lead to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publication2008 IEEE Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2008 - Assuring Mission Success
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 2008
    Event2008 IEEE Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2008 - Assuring Mission Success - Washington, DC, United States
    Duration: Nov 17 2008Nov 19 2008

    Other

    Other2008 IEEE Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2008 - Assuring Mission Success
    CountryUnited States
    CityWashington, DC
    Period11/17/0811/19/08

    Fingerprint

    Game theory
    Permeation
    Wireless networks
    Network protocols
    Uncertainty

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

    Cite this

    Dehnie, S., & Memon, N. (2008). Cooperative diversity as a dynamic game with incomplete information. In 2008 IEEE Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2008 - Assuring Mission Success [4753035] https://doi.org/10.1109/MILCOM.2008.4753035

    Cooperative diversity as a dynamic game with incomplete information. / Dehnie, Sintayehu; Memon, Nasir.

    2008 IEEE Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2008 - Assuring Mission Success. 2008. 4753035.

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Dehnie, S & Memon, N 2008, Cooperative diversity as a dynamic game with incomplete information. in 2008 IEEE Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2008 - Assuring Mission Success., 4753035, 2008 IEEE Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2008 - Assuring Mission Success, Washington, DC, United States, 11/17/08. https://doi.org/10.1109/MILCOM.2008.4753035
    Dehnie S, Memon N. Cooperative diversity as a dynamic game with incomplete information. In 2008 IEEE Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2008 - Assuring Mission Success. 2008. 4753035 https://doi.org/10.1109/MILCOM.2008.4753035
    Dehnie, Sintayehu ; Memon, Nasir. / Cooperative diversity as a dynamic game with incomplete information. 2008 IEEE Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2008 - Assuring Mission Success. 2008.
    @inproceedings{becfd07acd5c4e86bcb9053c2c7356c1,
    title = "Cooperative diversity as a dynamic game with incomplete information",
    abstract = "Cooperative diversity protocols are designed with the assumption that terminals always help each other in a socially efficient manner. This assumption may not be valid in commercial wireless networks where terminals may misbehave for selfish or malicious intentions. The presence of misbehaving terminals creates a social-dilemma where terminals exhibit uncertainty about the cooperative behavior of other terminals in the network. Cooperation in social-dilemma is characterized by a sub-optimal Nash equilibrium where wireless terminals opt out of cooperation. Hence, without establishing a mechanism to detect and mitigates effects of misbehavior, it is difficult to maintain a socially optimal cooperation. In this paper, we analyze effects of misbehavior based on game theoretic approaches. We show using evolutionary game theory, the permeation of selfish behavior in cooperative diversity. Our main goal is to design a mechanism that would enable wireless terminals to select reliable partners in the presence of uncertainty. To this end, we characterize cooperative diversity within the framework of a dynamic game with incomplete information. We introduce a reputation mechanism which would lead to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.",
    author = "Sintayehu Dehnie and Nasir Memon",
    year = "2008",
    doi = "10.1109/MILCOM.2008.4753035",
    language = "English (US)",
    isbn = "9781424426775",
    booktitle = "2008 IEEE Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2008 - Assuring Mission Success",

    }

    TY - GEN

    T1 - Cooperative diversity as a dynamic game with incomplete information

    AU - Dehnie, Sintayehu

    AU - Memon, Nasir

    PY - 2008

    Y1 - 2008

    N2 - Cooperative diversity protocols are designed with the assumption that terminals always help each other in a socially efficient manner. This assumption may not be valid in commercial wireless networks where terminals may misbehave for selfish or malicious intentions. The presence of misbehaving terminals creates a social-dilemma where terminals exhibit uncertainty about the cooperative behavior of other terminals in the network. Cooperation in social-dilemma is characterized by a sub-optimal Nash equilibrium where wireless terminals opt out of cooperation. Hence, without establishing a mechanism to detect and mitigates effects of misbehavior, it is difficult to maintain a socially optimal cooperation. In this paper, we analyze effects of misbehavior based on game theoretic approaches. We show using evolutionary game theory, the permeation of selfish behavior in cooperative diversity. Our main goal is to design a mechanism that would enable wireless terminals to select reliable partners in the presence of uncertainty. To this end, we characterize cooperative diversity within the framework of a dynamic game with incomplete information. We introduce a reputation mechanism which would lead to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.

    AB - Cooperative diversity protocols are designed with the assumption that terminals always help each other in a socially efficient manner. This assumption may not be valid in commercial wireless networks where terminals may misbehave for selfish or malicious intentions. The presence of misbehaving terminals creates a social-dilemma where terminals exhibit uncertainty about the cooperative behavior of other terminals in the network. Cooperation in social-dilemma is characterized by a sub-optimal Nash equilibrium where wireless terminals opt out of cooperation. Hence, without establishing a mechanism to detect and mitigates effects of misbehavior, it is difficult to maintain a socially optimal cooperation. In this paper, we analyze effects of misbehavior based on game theoretic approaches. We show using evolutionary game theory, the permeation of selfish behavior in cooperative diversity. Our main goal is to design a mechanism that would enable wireless terminals to select reliable partners in the presence of uncertainty. To this end, we characterize cooperative diversity within the framework of a dynamic game with incomplete information. We introduce a reputation mechanism which would lead to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=78650759692&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=78650759692&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    U2 - 10.1109/MILCOM.2008.4753035

    DO - 10.1109/MILCOM.2008.4753035

    M3 - Conference contribution

    SN - 9781424426775

    BT - 2008 IEEE Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2008 - Assuring Mission Success

    ER -