Cooperative Autocracies

Leader Survival, Creditworthiness, and Bilateral Investment Treaties*

Eric Arias, James R. Hollyer, Bryan Rosendorff

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Capital accumulation is essential for economic development, but investors face risk when putting their capital to productive use. Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) commit leaders to limiting their takings of foreign assets and the revenues they generate. We offer theory and evidence that BITs enhance leader survival more in autocracies than democracies. BITs improve the “investment climate” in signatory states, and they do so by more in autocratic polities. Hazard models offer supporting evidence of improved autocratic leader survival. The improvement in the investment climate is evidenced by improvement of creditworthiness scores and higher sovereign bond prices, again with greater effect in autocratic states. Autocratic leaders have the most to gain from importing property rights–enhancing institutions.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    JournalAmerican Journal of Political Science
    DOIs
    StateAccepted/In press - Jan 1 2018

    Fingerprint

    treaty
    leader
    climate
    capital accumulation
    investor
    evidence
    revenue
    assets
    democracy
    economics

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science
    • Political Science and International Relations

    Cite this

    Cooperative Autocracies : Leader Survival, Creditworthiness, and Bilateral Investment Treaties*. / Arias, Eric; Hollyer, James R.; Rosendorff, Bryan.

    In: American Journal of Political Science, 01.01.2018.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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