Cooperation, cooptation, and rebellion under dictatorships

Jennifer Gandhi, Adam Przeworski

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Dictatorships are not all the same: some are purely autocratic but many exhibit a full panoply of seemingly democratic institutions. To explain these differences, we develop a model in which dictators may need cooperation to generate rents and may face a threat of rebellion. Dictators have two instruments: they can make policy concessions or share rents. We conclude that when they need more cooperation dictators make more extensive policy concessions and share fewer rents. In turn, when the threat of rebellion is greater, they make larger concessions but also distribute more spoils. Assuming that policy concessions require an institutional setting of legislatures and parties, we test this prediction statistically for all dictatorships that existed between 1946 and 1996.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)1-26
    Number of pages26
    JournalEconomics and Politics
    Volume18
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Mar 2006

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    Dictatorship
    Rebellion
    Concession
    Dictator
    Rent
    Threat
    Legislatures
    Prediction
    Democratic institutions

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Cooperation, cooptation, and rebellion under dictatorships. / Gandhi, Jennifer; Przeworski, Adam.

    In: Economics and Politics, Vol. 18, No. 1, 03.2006, p. 1-26.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Gandhi, Jennifer ; Przeworski, Adam. / Cooperation, cooptation, and rebellion under dictatorships. In: Economics and Politics. 2006 ; Vol. 18, No. 1. pp. 1-26.
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