Contract evolution and institutional innovation

Marketing Pacific-grown apples from 1890 to 1930

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Between 1890 and 1930, the development of refrigerated rail transportation enabled a national U.S. apple industry to emerge. Apples were shipped over long distances, and sold in the terminal market on consignment or FOB, or in the auction market. There were frequent disputes over quality, caused by the long distances between buyers and sellers, the natural decline in apple quality over time, and because farmer and railroad moral hazard could accelerate quality deterioration. By 1930, apple transactions relied on government quality standards and inspection services. Evidence suggests that these institutions emerged in response to contract-enforcement and quality problems.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)189-212
Number of pages24
JournalJournal of Economic History
Volume62
Issue number1
StatePublished - 2002

Fingerprint

Institutional innovation
Marketing
Apple
Innovation
Government
Contract enforcement
Rail
Quality standards
Seller
Industry
Consignment
Inspection
Auction market
Railroad
Deterioration
Farmers
Dispute
Buyers
Moral hazard
Hazard

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • History
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Contract evolution and institutional innovation : Marketing Pacific-grown apples from 1890 to 1930. / Dimitri, Carolyn.

In: Journal of Economic History, Vol. 62, No. 1, 2002, p. 189-212.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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