Conceptual mastery and the knowledge argument

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

According to Frank Jackson's famous knowledge argument, Mary, a brilliant neuroscientist raised in a black and white room and bestowed with complete physical knowledge, cannot know certain truths about phenomenal experience. This claim about knowledge, in turn, implies that physicalism is false. I argue that the knowledge argument founders on a dilemma. Either (i) Mary cannot know the relevant experiential truths because of trivial obstacles that have no bearing on the truth of physicalism or (ii) once the obstacles have been removed, Mary can know the relevant truths. If we give Mary the epistemological capabilities necessary to draw metaphysical conclusions about physicalism, she will, while trapped in the black and white room, be able to know every truth about phenomenal experience.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)125-147
Number of pages23
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume154
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - May 1 2011

Fingerprint

Mastery
Knowledge Argument
Physicalism
White Room
Physical
Frank Jackson
Epistemological
Metaphysical

Keywords

  • Concept possession
  • Concepts
  • Conceptual mastery
  • Consciousness
  • Dualism
  • Knowledge argument
  • Modal rationalism
  • Phenomenal concept
  • Phenomenal concept strategy
  • Phenomenal experience
  • Physicalism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Conceptual mastery and the knowledge argument. / Rabin, Gabriel.

In: Philosophical Studies, Vol. 154, No. 1, 01.05.2011, p. 125-147.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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