Complex questionnaires

Jacob Glazer, Ariel Rubinstein

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We study a principal-agent model in which the agent is boundedly rational in his ability to understand the principal's decision rule. The principal wishes to elicit an agent's true profile so as to determine whether or not to grant him a certain request. The principal designs a questionnaire and commits himself to accepting certain responses. In designing such a questionnaire, the principal takes into account the bounded rationality of the agent and wishes to reduce the success probability of a dishonest agent who is trying to game the system. It is shown that the principal can construct a sufficiently complex questionnaire that will allow him to respond optimally to agents who tell the truth and at the same time to almost eliminate the probability that a dishonest agent will succeed in cheating.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)1529-1541
    Number of pages13
    JournalEconometrica
    Volume82
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 2014

    Fingerprint

    Questionnaire
    Cheating
    Decision rules
    Principal-agent model
    Bounded rationality

    Keywords

    • Bounded rationality
    • Persuasion games
    • Questionnaires

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Glazer, J., & Rubinstein, A. (2014). Complex questionnaires. Econometrica, 82(4), 1529-1541. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA11571

    Complex questionnaires. / Glazer, Jacob; Rubinstein, Ariel.

    In: Econometrica, Vol. 82, No. 4, 2014, p. 1529-1541.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Glazer, J & Rubinstein, A 2014, 'Complex questionnaires', Econometrica, vol. 82, no. 4, pp. 1529-1541. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA11571
    Glazer J, Rubinstein A. Complex questionnaires. Econometrica. 2014;82(4):1529-1541. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA11571
    Glazer, Jacob ; Rubinstein, Ariel. / Complex questionnaires. In: Econometrica. 2014 ; Vol. 82, No. 4. pp. 1529-1541.
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