Complementary institutions and economic development

An experimental study

Andrew Kloosterman, Andrew Schotter

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    This paper considers the problem of why societies develop differently, a question most recently articulated by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). We follow North (1990) in defining institutions as the “rules of the game in society.” The question then becomes why do some societies develop functional institutions while others do not? To investigate this question, we develop and examine a specific type of dynamic game (which we call an Institutional Game). Our point is that complementarities among the choices that all societies make as they develop can help to answer this question.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)186-205
    Number of pages20
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume99
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Sep 1 2016

    Fingerprint

    Experimental study
    Economic development
    Dynamic games
    Complementarity

    Keywords

    • Dynamic games
    • Economic development
    • Institutions

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Finance
    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Complementary institutions and economic development : An experimental study. / Kloosterman, Andrew; Schotter, Andrew.

    In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 99, 01.09.2016, p. 186-205.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Kloosterman, Andrew ; Schotter, Andrew. / Complementary institutions and economic development : An experimental study. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2016 ; Vol. 99. pp. 186-205.
    @article{c509380465c74ca4a87d057019e0ce7b,
    title = "Complementary institutions and economic development: An experimental study",
    abstract = "This paper considers the problem of why societies develop differently, a question most recently articulated by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). We follow North (1990) in defining institutions as the “rules of the game in society.” The question then becomes why do some societies develop functional institutions while others do not? To investigate this question, we develop and examine a specific type of dynamic game (which we call an Institutional Game). Our point is that complementarities among the choices that all societies make as they develop can help to answer this question.",
    keywords = "Dynamic games, Economic development, Institutions",
    author = "Andrew Kloosterman and Andrew Schotter",
    year = "2016",
    month = "9",
    day = "1",
    doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.001",
    language = "English (US)",
    volume = "99",
    pages = "186--205",
    journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
    issn = "0899-8256",
    publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

    }

    TY - JOUR

    T1 - Complementary institutions and economic development

    T2 - An experimental study

    AU - Kloosterman, Andrew

    AU - Schotter, Andrew

    PY - 2016/9/1

    Y1 - 2016/9/1

    N2 - This paper considers the problem of why societies develop differently, a question most recently articulated by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). We follow North (1990) in defining institutions as the “rules of the game in society.” The question then becomes why do some societies develop functional institutions while others do not? To investigate this question, we develop and examine a specific type of dynamic game (which we call an Institutional Game). Our point is that complementarities among the choices that all societies make as they develop can help to answer this question.

    AB - This paper considers the problem of why societies develop differently, a question most recently articulated by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). We follow North (1990) in defining institutions as the “rules of the game in society.” The question then becomes why do some societies develop functional institutions while others do not? To investigate this question, we develop and examine a specific type of dynamic game (which we call an Institutional Game). Our point is that complementarities among the choices that all societies make as they develop can help to answer this question.

    KW - Dynamic games

    KW - Economic development

    KW - Institutions

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84985995877&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84985995877&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.001

    DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.001

    M3 - Article

    VL - 99

    SP - 186

    EP - 205

    JO - Games and Economic Behavior

    JF - Games and Economic Behavior

    SN - 0899-8256

    ER -