Competitive fair division

Steven Brams, D. M. Kilgour

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Several indivisible goods are to be divided among two or more players, whose bids for the goods determine their prices. An equitable assignment of the goods at competitive prices is given by a fair-division procedure, called the Gap Procedure, that ensures (1) nonnegative prices that never exceed the bid of the player receiving the good; (2) Pareto optimality, though coupled with possible envy; (3) monotonicity, such that higher bids never hurt in obtaining a good; (4) sincere bids that preclude negative utility; and (5) prices that are partially independent of the amounts bid (as in a Vickrey auction). A variety of applications are discussed.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)418-443
    Number of pages26
    JournalJournal of Political Economy
    Volume109
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2001

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    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Brams, S., & Kilgour, D. M. (2001). Competitive fair division. Journal of Political Economy, 109(2), 418-443. https://doi.org/10.1086/319550