Competition, cooperation and collective choice

Thomas Markussen, Ernesto Reuben, Jean Robert Tyran

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

The ability of groups to implement efficiency-enhancing institutions is emerging as a central theme of research in economics. This study explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition, which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular but the electoral outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decide, competition is almost always adopted. If likely losers from competition have veto power, it is often not, and substantial gains in efficiency are foregone.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)F163-F195
Number of pages32
JournalEconomic Journal
Volume124
Issue number574
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 1 2014

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Collective choice
Cooperation and competition
Economics
Voting
Voting rules
Social dilemma
Veto power
Institutional choice
Intergroup

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Competition, cooperation and collective choice. / Markussen, Thomas; Reuben, Ernesto; Tyran, Jean Robert.

In: Economic Journal, Vol. 124, No. 574, 01.02.2014, p. F163-F195.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Markussen, Thomas ; Reuben, Ernesto ; Tyran, Jean Robert. / Competition, cooperation and collective choice. In: Economic Journal. 2014 ; Vol. 124, No. 574. pp. F163-F195.
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