Collusion-resilient credit-based reputations for peer-to-peer content distribution

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

With growing demand for high-quality multimedia content, content providers face enormous pressure to scale the serving capacity. Peer-to-peer content distribution is a natural low cost option to scale system capacity. In a P2P CDN model, content providers serve content using a small number of "official" seeder nodes and rely on participating users to act as individual seeders for others in the system. Although P2P CDNs have the potential to drastically reduce the required serving capacity of official seeders, they must address the challenge of incentivizing users to stay online in the P2P network and act as seeders.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationNetEcon '10 - 2010 Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation
DOIs
StatePublished - 2010
Event2010 Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation, NetEcon '10 - Vancouver, BC, Canada
Duration: Oct 3 2010Oct 3 2010

Other

Other2010 Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation, NetEcon '10
CountryCanada
CityVancouver, BC
Period10/3/1010/3/10

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computational Theory and Mathematics
  • Computer Networks and Communications

Cite this

Tran, N., Li, J., & Subramanian, L. (2010). Collusion-resilient credit-based reputations for peer-to-peer content distribution. In NetEcon '10 - 2010 Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation [2] https://doi.org/10.1145/1879082.1879085

Collusion-resilient credit-based reputations for peer-to-peer content distribution. / Tran, Nguyen; Li, Jinyang; Subramanian, Lakshminarayanan.

NetEcon '10 - 2010 Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation. 2010. 2.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Tran, N, Li, J & Subramanian, L 2010, Collusion-resilient credit-based reputations for peer-to-peer content distribution. in NetEcon '10 - 2010 Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation., 2, 2010 Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation, NetEcon '10, Vancouver, BC, Canada, 10/3/10. https://doi.org/10.1145/1879082.1879085
Tran N, Li J, Subramanian L. Collusion-resilient credit-based reputations for peer-to-peer content distribution. In NetEcon '10 - 2010 Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation. 2010. 2 https://doi.org/10.1145/1879082.1879085
Tran, Nguyen ; Li, Jinyang ; Subramanian, Lakshminarayanan. / Collusion-resilient credit-based reputations for peer-to-peer content distribution. NetEcon '10 - 2010 Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation. 2010.
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