Cognition and strategy

A deliberation experiment

Eric Dickson, Catherine Hafer, Dimitri Landa

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    A theory of deliberation must provide a plausible account both of individuals' choices to speak or to listen and of how they reinterpret their own views in the aftermath of deliberation. We describe a game-theoretic laboratory experiment in which subjects with diverse interests speak or listen before voting over a common outcome. An important feature of our strategic setting is that introspective agents may, upon hearing an unpersuasive argument, update away from the speaker's preferred position. While subjects are responsive to strategic incentives, they also deviate from Bayesian predictions by "overspeaking" when speech is likelier to alienate than persuade. Subjects thus come closer to the deliberative democratic ideal of a free exchange of arguments than equilibrium predictions suggest. We interpret evidence from subjects' deliberative choices and policy votes in terms of a cognitive hierarchy among subjects, defined by differing abilities to grasp the strategic implications of different kinds of information.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)974-989
    Number of pages16
    JournalJournal of Politics
    Volume70
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Oct 2008

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    deliberation
    cognition
    experiment
    laboratory experiment
    voting
    voter
    incentive
    ability
    evidence

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    Cognition and strategy : A deliberation experiment. / Dickson, Eric; Hafer, Catherine; Landa, Dimitri.

    In: Journal of Politics, Vol. 70, No. 4, 10.2008, p. 974-989.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Dickson, E, Hafer, C & Landa, D 2008, 'Cognition and strategy: A deliberation experiment', Journal of Politics, vol. 70, no. 4, pp. 974-989. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381608081000
    Dickson, Eric ; Hafer, Catherine ; Landa, Dimitri. / Cognition and strategy : A deliberation experiment. In: Journal of Politics. 2008 ; Vol. 70, No. 4. pp. 974-989.
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