Coercive Leadership

Dimitri Landa, Scott A. Tyson

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We develop a model of leadership in which an informed leader has some degree of coercive influence over her followers (agents). Agents benefit from coordination but face two distinct challenges: dispersed information and heterogeneous preferences. The leader's coercive power facilitates coordination by weakening the effect presented by both of these challenges through "binding" agents to a strategically chosen policy. The leader's policy choice becomes more informative to the agents about the leader's privately held information as her coercive capacity increases. By adjusting her policy choice in response to available private and public information, the coercive leader achieves her preferred average of agents' actions, and in so doing, neutralizes the possibly deleterious coordinating influence of public information. We develop implications of our analysis for understanding autocratic leadership in different political and organizational contexts.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    JournalAmerican Journal of Political Science
    DOIs
    StateAccepted/In press - 2017

    Fingerprint

    leadership
    leader
    follower

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    Coercive Leadership. / Landa, Dimitri; Tyson, Scott A.

    In: American Journal of Political Science, 2017.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Landa, Dimitri ; Tyson, Scott A. / Coercive Leadership. In: American Journal of Political Science. 2017.
    @article{f2ae04f4a9ee486298225521956a3a24,
    title = "Coercive Leadership",
    abstract = "We develop a model of leadership in which an informed leader has some degree of coercive influence over her followers (agents). Agents benefit from coordination but face two distinct challenges: dispersed information and heterogeneous preferences. The leader's coercive power facilitates coordination by weakening the effect presented by both of these challenges through {"}binding{"} agents to a strategically chosen policy. The leader's policy choice becomes more informative to the agents about the leader's privately held information as her coercive capacity increases. By adjusting her policy choice in response to available private and public information, the coercive leader achieves her preferred average of agents' actions, and in so doing, neutralizes the possibly deleterious coordinating influence of public information. We develop implications of our analysis for understanding autocratic leadership in different political and organizational contexts.",
    author = "Dimitri Landa and Tyson, {Scott A.}",
    year = "2017",
    doi = "10.1111/ajps.12303",
    language = "English (US)",
    journal = "American Journal of Political Science",
    issn = "0092-5853",
    publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",

    }

    TY - JOUR

    T1 - Coercive Leadership

    AU - Landa, Dimitri

    AU - Tyson, Scott A.

    PY - 2017

    Y1 - 2017

    N2 - We develop a model of leadership in which an informed leader has some degree of coercive influence over her followers (agents). Agents benefit from coordination but face two distinct challenges: dispersed information and heterogeneous preferences. The leader's coercive power facilitates coordination by weakening the effect presented by both of these challenges through "binding" agents to a strategically chosen policy. The leader's policy choice becomes more informative to the agents about the leader's privately held information as her coercive capacity increases. By adjusting her policy choice in response to available private and public information, the coercive leader achieves her preferred average of agents' actions, and in so doing, neutralizes the possibly deleterious coordinating influence of public information. We develop implications of our analysis for understanding autocratic leadership in different political and organizational contexts.

    AB - We develop a model of leadership in which an informed leader has some degree of coercive influence over her followers (agents). Agents benefit from coordination but face two distinct challenges: dispersed information and heterogeneous preferences. The leader's coercive power facilitates coordination by weakening the effect presented by both of these challenges through "binding" agents to a strategically chosen policy. The leader's policy choice becomes more informative to the agents about the leader's privately held information as her coercive capacity increases. By adjusting her policy choice in response to available private and public information, the coercive leader achieves her preferred average of agents' actions, and in so doing, neutralizes the possibly deleterious coordinating influence of public information. We develop implications of our analysis for understanding autocratic leadership in different political and organizational contexts.

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85020192642&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85020192642&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    U2 - 10.1111/ajps.12303

    DO - 10.1111/ajps.12303

    M3 - Article

    JO - American Journal of Political Science

    JF - American Journal of Political Science

    SN - 0092-5853

    ER -