Cities as Lobbyists

Rebecca Goldstein, Hye Young You

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Individual cities are active interest groups in lobbying the federal government, and yet the dynamics of this intergovernmental lobbying are poorly understood. We argue that preference incongruence between a city and its parent state government leads to underprovision of public goods, and cities need to appeal to the federal government for additional resources. We provide evidence for this theory using a data set of over 13,800 lobbying disclosures filed by cities with populations over 25,000 between 1999 and 2012. Income inequality and ethnic fragmentation are also highly related to federal lobbying activities. Using an instrumental variables analysis of earmark and Recovery Act grant data, we show that each dollar a city spends on lobbying generates substantial returns.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)864-876
    Number of pages13
    JournalAmerican Journal of Political Science
    Volume61
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Oct 1 2017

    Fingerprint

    Federal Government
    interest group
    dollar
    fragmentation
    grant
    appeal
    parents
    act
    income
    resources
    evidence

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science
    • Political Science and International Relations

    Cite this

    Cities as Lobbyists. / Goldstein, Rebecca; You, Hye Young.

    In: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 61, No. 4, 01.10.2017, p. 864-876.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Goldstein, R & You, HY 2017, 'Cities as Lobbyists', American Journal of Political Science, vol. 61, no. 4, pp. 864-876. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12306
    Goldstein, Rebecca ; You, Hye Young. / Cities as Lobbyists. In: American Journal of Political Science. 2017 ; Vol. 61, No. 4. pp. 864-876.
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