Choosing democracy

Bryan Rosendorff

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    In an autocracy, the ruling elite allocates resources to unproductive contest activities in order to protect its power. This paper establishes that a flatter income distribution, a slow-growing or shrinking capital stock, and a decrease in the relative size of the workforce increases the likelihood of a decision by the ruling elite to negotiate a transition to democracy. In a model of economic cooperation and political conflict, the losses from ceding control over the tax rate may be lower than the costs of defending minority privilege. These predictions are evaluated in the light of the South African and other recent transitions.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)1-29
    Number of pages29
    JournalEconomics and Politics
    Volume13
    Issue number1
    StatePublished - 2001

    Fingerprint

    Democracy
    Elites
    Workforce
    Africa
    Resources
    Autocracy
    Income distribution
    Contests
    Economic cooperation
    Capital stock
    Prediction
    Minorities
    Costs
    Tax rate

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Rosendorff, B. (2001). Choosing democracy. Economics and Politics, 13(1), 1-29.

    Choosing democracy. / Rosendorff, Bryan.

    In: Economics and Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2001, p. 1-29.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Rosendorff, B 2001, 'Choosing democracy', Economics and Politics, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 1-29.
    Rosendorff B. Choosing democracy. Economics and Politics. 2001;13(1):1-29.
    Rosendorff, Bryan. / Choosing democracy. In: Economics and Politics. 2001 ; Vol. 13, No. 1. pp. 1-29.
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