Can the SHIELD protect our integrated circuits?

Farinaz Koushanfar, Ramesh Karri

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Mass production of Integrated Circuits (ICs) from a single blueprint (mask) renders inherent identification of the individual parts a challenge. Indelible marking of the ICs can enable fingerprinting, identification, authentication, metering, and tracing of components along the unascertained semiconductor supply chain. To enable these important objectives, DARPA is soliciting innovative proposals for a SHIELD that enables advanced supply chain hardware authentication capability. The envisioned SHIELD is intended to be a minuscule electronic chip that is physically and inseparably attached to the host electronic component. The desiderata for the SHIELD include providing an ineradicable hardware root-of-trust for cryptographic key storage and encryption, a compact structure encapsulating the keys, a physically-fragile but electrically-robust SHIELD dielet that self-destructs upon adversarial acts, an RF communication and remote charging interface, and sensors for recording the potential attack attempts. We discuss the SHIELD threat model and its potential for addressing a number of standing challenges in this area. We emphasize the dire need for open evaluation and thorough security analysis of SHIELD.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2014 IEEE 57th International Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems, MWSCAS 2014
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages350-353
Number of pages4
ISBN (Print)9781479941346, 9781479941346
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 23 2014
Event2014 IEEE 57th International Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems, MWSCAS 2014 - College Station, United States
Duration: Aug 3 2014Aug 6 2014

Other

Other2014 IEEE 57th International Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems, MWSCAS 2014
CountryUnited States
CityCollege Station
Period8/3/148/6/14

Fingerprint

Authentication
Supply chains
Integrated circuits
Hardware
Blueprints
Cryptography
Masks
Semiconductor materials
Communication
Sensors

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Electronic, Optical and Magnetic Materials

Cite this

Koushanfar, F., & Karri, R. (2014). Can the SHIELD protect our integrated circuits? In 2014 IEEE 57th International Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems, MWSCAS 2014 (pp. 350-353). [6908424] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/MWSCAS.2014.6908424

Can the SHIELD protect our integrated circuits? / Koushanfar, Farinaz; Karri, Ramesh.

2014 IEEE 57th International Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems, MWSCAS 2014. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2014. p. 350-353 6908424.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Koushanfar, F & Karri, R 2014, Can the SHIELD protect our integrated circuits? in 2014 IEEE 57th International Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems, MWSCAS 2014., 6908424, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 350-353, 2014 IEEE 57th International Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems, MWSCAS 2014, College Station, United States, 8/3/14. https://doi.org/10.1109/MWSCAS.2014.6908424
Koushanfar F, Karri R. Can the SHIELD protect our integrated circuits? In 2014 IEEE 57th International Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems, MWSCAS 2014. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2014. p. 350-353. 6908424 https://doi.org/10.1109/MWSCAS.2014.6908424
Koushanfar, Farinaz ; Karri, Ramesh. / Can the SHIELD protect our integrated circuits?. 2014 IEEE 57th International Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems, MWSCAS 2014. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2014. pp. 350-353
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