Building the Rule of International Criminal Law

The Role of Judges and Prosecutors in the Apprehension of War Criminals

Gwyneth Hartman-Mcclendon

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    International criminal tribunals are weak institutions, especially since they do not have their own police forces to execute arrest warrants. Understandably then, much of the existing literature has focused exclusively on pressure from major powers and on changing domestic politics to explain the apprehension of suspected war criminals. In contrast, this article turns attention back to the tribunals themselves. I propose three ways in which the activities of international criminal tribunals impact compliance with arrest warrants: through the selection of individuals to indict, demonstrated leniency on some suspects and outreach to domestic legal professionals. Using a duration model that accounts for sample selection and data collected on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, I test these theories alongside other existing explanations. I find that court activities can have an independent effect on the successful implementation of international criminal law.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)349-372
    Number of pages24
    JournalHuman Rights Review
    Volume10
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 2009

    Fingerprint

    criminal law
    international law
    test theory
    Rwanda
    Yugoslavia
    police
    politics

    Keywords

    • International law. compliance.war crimes. human rights. tribunals

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science
    • Law

    Cite this

    Building the Rule of International Criminal Law : The Role of Judges and Prosecutors in the Apprehension of War Criminals. / Hartman-Mcclendon, Gwyneth.

    In: Human Rights Review, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2009, p. 349-372.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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