Bringing the minority back to the party: An informational theory of majority and minority parties in Congress

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Scholars of Congress and other legislative institutions have posited that majority agenda-setting is one of the primary mechanisms by which a majority party demonstrates its power over legislation. However, this line of work has difficulty explaining why the floor median would delegate such power to the majority. In this paper, I develop a theory of lawmaking in an incomplete-information environment. The model allows for information transmission through both majority agenda-setting and minority speech making. This is one of the first models of parties in Congress that allows for the minority to have an active and vital role. Comparative statics show that, for a wide set of parameter values, the institutional arrangement proposed is optimal for the floor median when compared to strict majoritarian and minority-free settings.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)132-150
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of Theoretical Politics
Volume27
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2015

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Keywords

  • Agenda setting
  • cheap talk
  • parties

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

Bringing the minority back to the party : An informational theory of majority and minority parties in Congress. / Ramey, Adam.

In: Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 27, No. 1, 01.01.2015, p. 132-150.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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