Blurred Lines: Public-Private Interactions in Carbon Regulations

Jessica Green

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Carbon markets are flourishing around the globe, created both by governments and by nonstate actors. In this article, I investigate when and why governments choose to interact with and use private rules about carbon offsets in public regulatory arrangements. The analysis demonstrates that there is “blurring” between public and private authority, insofar that there are a multiple interactions between the two spheres. However, a closer look reveals that most of these are of a relatively weak nature, since private standards are used for voluntary rather than compliance purposes. To explain this trend, I use qualitative and quantitative analysis and find that NGOs are the main catalysts for the interaction between public and private rules. States are most likely to interact with private regulations when they have large numbers of NGOs active within their borders. In short, private authority is largely a complement to public regulatory arrangements. While previous work that suggests that private authority arises when there are gaps in public rules, the analysis here demonstrates that at the domestic level, this logic does not hold.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)103-128
    Number of pages26
    JournalInternational Interactions
    Volume43
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jan 2 2017

    Fingerprint

    regulation
    non-governmental organization
    interaction
    market
    trend

    Keywords

    • Carbon markets
    • carbon offsets
    • climate change
    • network analysis
    • private regulation
    • transnational actors

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Political Science and International Relations

    Cite this

    Blurred Lines : Public-Private Interactions in Carbon Regulations. / Green, Jessica.

    In: International Interactions, Vol. 43, No. 1, 02.01.2017, p. 103-128.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Green, Jessica. / Blurred Lines : Public-Private Interactions in Carbon Regulations. In: International Interactions. 2017 ; Vol. 43, No. 1. pp. 103-128.
    @article{1a582322795c4f369f9ba04114f65607,
    title = "Blurred Lines: Public-Private Interactions in Carbon Regulations",
    abstract = "Carbon markets are flourishing around the globe, created both by governments and by nonstate actors. In this article, I investigate when and why governments choose to interact with and use private rules about carbon offsets in public regulatory arrangements. The analysis demonstrates that there is “blurring” between public and private authority, insofar that there are a multiple interactions between the two spheres. However, a closer look reveals that most of these are of a relatively weak nature, since private standards are used for voluntary rather than compliance purposes. To explain this trend, I use qualitative and quantitative analysis and find that NGOs are the main catalysts for the interaction between public and private rules. States are most likely to interact with private regulations when they have large numbers of NGOs active within their borders. In short, private authority is largely a complement to public regulatory arrangements. While previous work that suggests that private authority arises when there are gaps in public rules, the analysis here demonstrates that at the domestic level, this logic does not hold.",
    keywords = "Carbon markets, carbon offsets, climate change, network analysis, private regulation, transnational actors",
    author = "Jessica Green",
    year = "2017",
    month = "1",
    day = "2",
    doi = "10.1080/03050629.2016.1210943",
    language = "English (US)",
    volume = "43",
    pages = "103--128",
    journal = "International Interactions",
    issn = "0305-0629",
    publisher = "Taylor and Francis Ltd.",
    number = "1",

    }

    TY - JOUR

    T1 - Blurred Lines

    T2 - Public-Private Interactions in Carbon Regulations

    AU - Green, Jessica

    PY - 2017/1/2

    Y1 - 2017/1/2

    N2 - Carbon markets are flourishing around the globe, created both by governments and by nonstate actors. In this article, I investigate when and why governments choose to interact with and use private rules about carbon offsets in public regulatory arrangements. The analysis demonstrates that there is “blurring” between public and private authority, insofar that there are a multiple interactions between the two spheres. However, a closer look reveals that most of these are of a relatively weak nature, since private standards are used for voluntary rather than compliance purposes. To explain this trend, I use qualitative and quantitative analysis and find that NGOs are the main catalysts for the interaction between public and private rules. States are most likely to interact with private regulations when they have large numbers of NGOs active within their borders. In short, private authority is largely a complement to public regulatory arrangements. While previous work that suggests that private authority arises when there are gaps in public rules, the analysis here demonstrates that at the domestic level, this logic does not hold.

    AB - Carbon markets are flourishing around the globe, created both by governments and by nonstate actors. In this article, I investigate when and why governments choose to interact with and use private rules about carbon offsets in public regulatory arrangements. The analysis demonstrates that there is “blurring” between public and private authority, insofar that there are a multiple interactions between the two spheres. However, a closer look reveals that most of these are of a relatively weak nature, since private standards are used for voluntary rather than compliance purposes. To explain this trend, I use qualitative and quantitative analysis and find that NGOs are the main catalysts for the interaction between public and private rules. States are most likely to interact with private regulations when they have large numbers of NGOs active within their borders. In short, private authority is largely a complement to public regulatory arrangements. While previous work that suggests that private authority arises when there are gaps in public rules, the analysis here demonstrates that at the domestic level, this logic does not hold.

    KW - Carbon markets

    KW - carbon offsets

    KW - climate change

    KW - network analysis

    KW - private regulation

    KW - transnational actors

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84982852220&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84982852220&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    U2 - 10.1080/03050629.2016.1210943

    DO - 10.1080/03050629.2016.1210943

    M3 - Article

    VL - 43

    SP - 103

    EP - 128

    JO - International Interactions

    JF - International Interactions

    SN - 0305-0629

    IS - 1

    ER -