Blind stealing

Experience and expertise in a mixed-strategy poker experiment

Matt Van Essen, John Wooders

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We explore the role of experience in mixed-strategy games by comparing, for a stylized version of Texas Hold-em, the behavior of experts, who have extensive experience playing poker online, to the behavior of novices. We find significant differences. The initial frequencies with which players bet and call are closer to equilibrium for experts than novices. And, while the betting and calling frequencies of both types of subjects exhibit too much heterogeneity to be consistent with equilibrium play, the frequencies of experts exhibit less heterogeneity. We find evidence that the style of online play transfers from the field to the lab.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)186-206
    Number of pages21
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume91
    DOIs
    StatePublished - May 1 2015

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    Expertise
    Mixed strategy
    Experiment
    Betting

    Keywords

    • Expertise
    • Laboratory experiments
    • Minimax
    • Mixed strategy

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Finance
    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Blind stealing : Experience and expertise in a mixed-strategy poker experiment. / Van Essen, Matt; Wooders, John.

    In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 91, 01.05.2015, p. 186-206.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Van Essen, Matt ; Wooders, John. / Blind stealing : Experience and expertise in a mixed-strategy poker experiment. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2015 ; Vol. 91. pp. 186-206.
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