Biases and Strategic Behaviour in Performance Evaluation: The Case of the FIFA's best soccer player award

Tom Coupe, Olivier Gergaud, Abdul Noury

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

In this paper, we study biases in performance evaluation by analysing votes for the FIFA Ballon d'Or award for best soccer player, the most prestigious award in the sport. Our findings suggest that ‘similarity’ biases are substantial, with jury members disproportionately voting for candidates from their own country, own national team, own continent and own league team. Further, we show that the impact of such biases on the total number of votes a candidate receives is fairly limited and hence is likely to affect the outcome of this competition only on rare occasions where the difference in quality between the leading candidates is small. Finally, analysing the incidence of ‘strategic voting’, we find jury members who vote for one leading candidate are more, rather than less, likely to also give points to his main competitor, as compared with neutral jury members. We discuss the implications of our findings for the design of awards, elections and performance evaluation systems in general and for the FIFA Ballon d'Or award in particular.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)358-379
Number of pages22
JournalOxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
Volume80
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1 2018

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soccer
Vote
Performance Evaluation
candidacy
Voting
voter
trend
Likely
evaluation
performance
voting
Elections
Incidence
Sports
incidence
election
Performance evaluation
Soccer
Strategic behavior
Juries

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

Cite this

Biases and Strategic Behaviour in Performance Evaluation : The Case of the FIFA's best soccer player award. / Coupe, Tom; Gergaud, Olivier; Noury, Abdul.

In: Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 80, No. 2, 01.04.2018, p. 358-379.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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