Abstract
In this paper we use a laboratory setting to manipulate our subjects' beliefs about the cognitive levels of the players they are playing against. We show that in the context of the 2/3 guessing game, individual choices crucially depend on their beliefs about the level of others. Hence, a subject's true cognitive level may be different than the one he exhibits in a game with the difference being attributed to his expectations about the sophistication of the players he is playing against.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 449-463 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
| Volume | 75 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jul 2012 |
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Keywords
- Beliefs
- Guessing game
- Level-k theory
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Finance
Cite this
Beliefs and endogenous cognitive levels : An experimental study. / Agranov, Marina; Potamites, Elizabeth; Schotter, Andrew; Tergiman, Chloe.
In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 75, No. 2, 07.2012, p. 449-463.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Beliefs and endogenous cognitive levels
T2 - An experimental study
AU - Agranov, Marina
AU - Potamites, Elizabeth
AU - Schotter, Andrew
AU - Tergiman, Chloe
PY - 2012/7
Y1 - 2012/7
N2 - In this paper we use a laboratory setting to manipulate our subjects' beliefs about the cognitive levels of the players they are playing against. We show that in the context of the 2/3 guessing game, individual choices crucially depend on their beliefs about the level of others. Hence, a subject's true cognitive level may be different than the one he exhibits in a game with the difference being attributed to his expectations about the sophistication of the players he is playing against.
AB - In this paper we use a laboratory setting to manipulate our subjects' beliefs about the cognitive levels of the players they are playing against. We show that in the context of the 2/3 guessing game, individual choices crucially depend on their beliefs about the level of others. Hence, a subject's true cognitive level may be different than the one he exhibits in a game with the difference being attributed to his expectations about the sophistication of the players he is playing against.
KW - Beliefs
KW - Guessing game
KW - Level-k theory
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84860633933&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84860633933&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.002
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.002
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84860633933
VL - 75
SP - 449
EP - 463
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
SN - 0899-8256
IS - 2
ER -