Beliefs and endogenous cognitive levels: An experimental study

Marina Agranov, Elizabeth Potamites, Andrew Schotter, Chloe Tergiman

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    In this paper we use a laboratory setting to manipulate our subjects' beliefs about the cognitive levels of the players they are playing against. We show that in the context of the 2/3 guessing game, individual choices crucially depend on their beliefs about the level of others. Hence, a subject's true cognitive level may be different than the one he exhibits in a game with the difference being attributed to his expectations about the sophistication of the players he is playing against.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)449-463
    Number of pages15
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume75
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jul 2012

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    Experimental study
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    Keywords

    • Beliefs
    • Guessing game
    • Level-k theory

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Finance

    Cite this

    Beliefs and endogenous cognitive levels : An experimental study. / Agranov, Marina; Potamites, Elizabeth; Schotter, Andrew; Tergiman, Chloe.

    In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 75, No. 2, 07.2012, p. 449-463.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Agranov, M, Potamites, E, Schotter, A & Tergiman, C 2012, 'Beliefs and endogenous cognitive levels: An experimental study', Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 75, no. 2, pp. 449-463. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.002
    Agranov, Marina ; Potamites, Elizabeth ; Schotter, Andrew ; Tergiman, Chloe. / Beliefs and endogenous cognitive levels : An experimental study. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2012 ; Vol. 75, No. 2. pp. 449-463.
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