### Abstract

Consider an infinitely repeated normal form game where each player is characterized by a "type" which may be unknown to the other players of the game. Impose only two conditions on the behavior of the players. First, impose the Savage (1954) axioms; i.e., each player has some beliefs about the evolution of the game and maximizes its expected payoffs at each date given those beliefs. Second, suppose that any event which has probability zero under one player's beliefs also has probability zero under the other player's beliefs. We show that under these two conditions limit points of beliefs and of the empirical distributions (i.e., sample path averages or histograms) are correlated equilibria of the "true" game (i.e., the game characterized by the true vector of types).

Original language | English (US) |
---|---|

Pages (from-to) | 821-841 |

Number of pages | 21 |

Journal | Economic Theory |

Volume | 4 |

Issue number | 6 |

DOIs | |

State | Published - Nov 1994 |

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### ASJC Scopus subject areas

- Economics and Econometrics

### Cite this

**Bayesian learning leads to correlated equilibria in normal form games.** / Nyarko, Yaw.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

*Economic Theory*, vol. 4, no. 6, pp. 821-841. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01213814

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Bayesian learning leads to correlated equilibria in normal form games

AU - Nyarko, Yaw

PY - 1994/11

Y1 - 1994/11

N2 - Consider an infinitely repeated normal form game where each player is characterized by a "type" which may be unknown to the other players of the game. Impose only two conditions on the behavior of the players. First, impose the Savage (1954) axioms; i.e., each player has some beliefs about the evolution of the game and maximizes its expected payoffs at each date given those beliefs. Second, suppose that any event which has probability zero under one player's beliefs also has probability zero under the other player's beliefs. We show that under these two conditions limit points of beliefs and of the empirical distributions (i.e., sample path averages or histograms) are correlated equilibria of the "true" game (i.e., the game characterized by the true vector of types).

AB - Consider an infinitely repeated normal form game where each player is characterized by a "type" which may be unknown to the other players of the game. Impose only two conditions on the behavior of the players. First, impose the Savage (1954) axioms; i.e., each player has some beliefs about the evolution of the game and maximizes its expected payoffs at each date given those beliefs. Second, suppose that any event which has probability zero under one player's beliefs also has probability zero under the other player's beliefs. We show that under these two conditions limit points of beliefs and of the empirical distributions (i.e., sample path averages or histograms) are correlated equilibria of the "true" game (i.e., the game characterized by the true vector of types).

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0000481276&partnerID=8YFLogxK

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U2 - 10.1007/BF01213814

DO - 10.1007/BF01213814

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0000481276

VL - 4

SP - 821

EP - 841

JO - Economic Theory

JF - Economic Theory

SN - 0938-2259

IS - 6

ER -