Bayesian learning and convergence to Nash equilibria without common priors

Yaw Nyarko

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Consider an infinitely repeated game where each player is characterized by a "type" which may be unknown to the other players in the game. Suppose further that each player's belief about others is independent of that player's type. Impose an absolute continuity condition on the ex ante beliefs of players (weaker than mutual absolute continuity). Then any limit point of beliefs of players about the future of the game conditional on the past lies in the set of Nash or Subjective equilibria. Our assumption does not require common priors so is weaker than Jordan (1991); however our conclusion is weaker, we obtain convergence to subjective and not necessarily Nash equilibria. Our model is a generalization of the Kalai and Lehrer (1993) model. Our assumption is weaker than theirs. However, our conclusion is also weaker, and shows that limit points of beliefs, and not actual play, are subjective equilibria.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)643-655
    Number of pages13
    JournalEconomic Theory
    Volume11
    Issue number3
    StatePublished - May 1998

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    Nash equilibrium
    Common priors
    Bayesian learning
    Continuity
    Jordan
    Infinitely repeated games

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Bayesian learning and convergence to Nash equilibria without common priors. / Nyarko, Yaw.

    In: Economic Theory, Vol. 11, No. 3, 05.1998, p. 643-655.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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