Bargaining a net gain compensation agreement between a marine renewable energy developer and a marine protected area manager

Zacharoula Kyriazi, Raul Lejano, Frank Maes, Steven Degraer

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

When the development of marine renewable energy (MRE) is only possible inside already established marine protected areas (MPAs), and there is a risk of ecosystem loss, environmental or monetary compensation -being the last step in a hierarchy of mitigation measures- might be an option for working out a trade-off between energy production and nature protection. In this article, it is argued that for this type of siting situation, instead of the well-established strategy of no net loss, a net gain should be provided from the MRE developer to the MPA manager, which acts as an incentive for the manager to cooperate and covers future potentially lost conservation benefits due to MRE potential damages. Based on this argument, a hypothetical example is used to demonstrate that a net gain is ensured only when there is a societal surplus from a combined MRE-MPA arrangement that can be divided between the players through bargaining. However, when asymmetric information is involved, it is shown that cooperative solution concepts are more sufficient for leaving both players better off after coexistence than before.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)40-48
Number of pages9
JournalMarine Policy
Volume60
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1 2015

Fingerprint

bargaining
renewable energy sources
renewable energy
protected area
conservation areas
managers
manager
asymmetric information
energy
potential energy
energy production
trade-off
coexistence
incentive
surpluses
cooperatives
damage
damages
ecosystem
conservation

Keywords

  • Compensation
  • Cooperative game theory
  • Nature conservation
  • Net gain
  • Offshore renewable energy
  • Transferable utility

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Aquatic Science
  • Environmental Science(all)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law
  • Law

Cite this

Bargaining a net gain compensation agreement between a marine renewable energy developer and a marine protected area manager. / Kyriazi, Zacharoula; Lejano, Raul; Maes, Frank; Degraer, Steven.

In: Marine Policy, Vol. 60, 01.10.2015, p. 40-48.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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