Asymmetric tournaments, equal opportunity laws, and affirmative action: Some experimental results

Andrew Schotter, Keith Weigelt

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    This paper assesses whether affirmative action programs and equal opportunity laws affect the output of economic agents. More precisely, we find that equal opportunity laws and affirmative action programs always benefit disadvantaged groups. Equal opportunity laws also increase the effort levels of all subjects and hence the profits of the tournament administrator (usually the firm). The effects of affirmative action programs depend on the severity of a group’s cost disadvantage. When the cost disadvantage is severe, these programs significantly increase effort levels (and hence profits). The opposite is true when the disadvantage is slight.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)511-539
    Number of pages29
    JournalQuarterly Journal of Economics
    Volume107
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 1992

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    Equal opportunities
    Tournament
    Affirmative action
    Disadvantage
    Costs
    Profit
    Economics
    Severity
    Disadvantaged groups

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Asymmetric tournaments, equal opportunity laws, and affirmative action : Some experimental results. / Schotter, Andrew; Weigelt, Keith.

    In: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 107, No. 2, 1992, p. 511-539.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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