Asymmetric enforcement of cooperation in a social dilemma

Nikos Nikiforakis, Hans Theo Normann, Brian Wallace

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We use a public-good experiment to analyze behavior in a decentralized asymmetric punishment institution. The institution is asymmetric in the sense that players differ in the effectiveness of their punishment. At the aggregate level, we observe remarkable similarities between outcomes in asymmetric and symmetric punishment institutions. Controlling for the average punishment effectiveness of the institutions, we find that asymmetric punishment institutions are as effective in fostering cooperation and are as efficient as symmetric institutions. At the individual level, we find that players with higher punishment effectiveness contribute similar amounts to the public account but have higher earnings and punish more than their weak counterparts.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)638-659
    Number of pages22
    JournalSouthern Economic Journal
    Volume76
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jan 1 2010

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    Social dilemma
    Enforcement
    Punishment

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Asymmetric enforcement of cooperation in a social dilemma. / Nikiforakis, Nikos; Normann, Hans Theo; Wallace, Brian.

    In: Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 76, No. 3, 01.01.2010, p. 638-659.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Nikiforakis, N, Normann, HT & Wallace, B 2010, 'Asymmetric enforcement of cooperation in a social dilemma', Southern Economic Journal, vol. 76, no. 3, pp. 638-659. https://doi.org/10.4284/sej.2010.76.3.638
    Nikiforakis, Nikos ; Normann, Hans Theo ; Wallace, Brian. / Asymmetric enforcement of cooperation in a social dilemma. In: Southern Economic Journal. 2010 ; Vol. 76, No. 3. pp. 638-659.
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