Assessing partisan bias in federal public corruption prosecutions

Sanford Gordon

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    The 2007 U.S. Attorney firing scandal raised the specter of political bias in the prosecution of officials under federal corruption laws. Has prosecutorial discretion been employed to persecute enemies or shield allies? To answer this question, I develop a model of the interaction between officials contemplating corruption and a prosecutor deciding whether to pursue cases against them. Biased prosecutors will be willing to file weaker cases against political opponents than against allies. Consequently, the model anticipates that in the presence of partisan bias, sentences of prosecuted opponents will tend to be lower than those of co-partisans. Employing newly collected data on public corruption prosecutions, I find evidence of partisan bias under both Bush (II) and Clinton Justice Departments. However, additional evidence suggests that these results may understate the extent of bias under Bush, while overstating it under Clinton.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)534-554
    Number of pages21
    JournalAmerican Political Science Review
    Volume103
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Nov 2009

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    prosecution
    corruption
    trend
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    scandal
    evidence
    justice
    Law
    interaction

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    Assessing partisan bias in federal public corruption prosecutions. / Gordon, Sanford.

    In: American Political Science Review, Vol. 103, No. 4, 11.2009, p. 534-554.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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