Arms Diffusion and War

Muhammet Bas, Andrew J. Coe

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

The authors present a model of the relationship between the spread of new military technologies and the occurrence of war. A new technology could shift the balance of power, causing anticipatory war as one side tries to prevent the other from obtaining it. When one side already has it, war is more likely when the shift in power is large, likely, and durable. When neither side has it, war is more likely when the expected shift is asymmetric (e.g., one side is more likely to get it) and when the two sides fear that a war will occur once one of them has it. The authors illustrate the model with historical examples from the spread of firearms (the Musket Wars in precolonial New Zealand) and of nuclear weapons (the end of US nuclear monopoly and the 1967 Six-Day War). A broader implication is that major power competition can unintentionally cause wars elsewhere.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)651-674
Number of pages24
JournalJournal of Conflict Resolution
Volume56
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 1 2012

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military engineering
balance of power
nuclear weapon
monopoly
new technology
New Zealand
anxiety
cause
Firearms
Nuclear weapons
Monopoly
Military
Durables

Keywords

  • bargaining models
  • nuclear weapons
  • preventive war
  • proliferation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Political Science and International Relations

Cite this

Arms Diffusion and War. / Bas, Muhammet; Coe, Andrew J.

In: Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 56, No. 4, 01.08.2012, p. 651-674.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Bas, Muhammet ; Coe, Andrew J. / Arms Diffusion and War. In: Journal of Conflict Resolution. 2012 ; Vol. 56, No. 4. pp. 651-674.
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