Arms Diffusion and War

Muhammet Bas, Andrew J. Coe

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    The authors present a model of the relationship between the spread of new military technologies and the occurrence of war. A new technology could shift the balance of power, causing anticipatory war as one side tries to prevent the other from obtaining it. When one side already has it, war is more likely when the shift in power is large, likely, and durable. When neither side has it, war is more likely when the expected shift is asymmetric (e.g., one side is more likely to get it) and when the two sides fear that a war will occur once one of them has it. The authors illustrate the model with historical examples from the spread of firearms (the Musket Wars in precolonial New Zealand) and of nuclear weapons (the end of US nuclear monopoly and the 1967 Six-Day War). A broader implication is that major power competition can unintentionally cause wars elsewhere.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)651-674
    Number of pages24
    JournalJournal of Conflict Resolution
    Volume56
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Aug 1 2012

    Fingerprint

    military engineering
    balance of power
    nuclear weapon
    monopoly
    new technology
    New Zealand
    anxiety
    cause
    Firearms
    Nuclear weapons
    Monopoly
    Military
    Durables

    Keywords

    • bargaining models
    • nuclear weapons
    • preventive war
    • proliferation

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
    • Sociology and Political Science
    • Political Science and International Relations

    Cite this

    Arms Diffusion and War. / Bas, Muhammet; Coe, Andrew J.

    In: Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 56, No. 4, 01.08.2012, p. 651-674.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Bas, Muhammet ; Coe, Andrew J. / Arms Diffusion and War. In: Journal of Conflict Resolution. 2012 ; Vol. 56, No. 4. pp. 651-674.
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