Archimedes in the lab

Can science identify good moral reasoning?

Regina Rini, Tommaso Bruni

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

Some ethicists try to settle moral disagreement by ruling out particular types of moral reasoning on the basis of cognitive scientific evidence. We argue that the cognitive science of reasoning is not well-suited to this Archimedean role. Through discussion of several influential research programs, we show that such attempts tend to either fail to be Archimedean (by assuming controversial moral views) or fail to settle disagreement (by getting caught up in unsettled debates about rationality). We speculate that these outcomes reflect a fundamental sort of normative disagreement, which can be reshuffled to the domains of morality or rationality, but cannot be avoided.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationMoral Inferences
PublisherTaylor and Francis
Pages155-169
Number of pages15
ISBN (Electronic)9781317383840
ISBN (Print)9781138937970
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2017

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Ethicists
Cognitive Science
Research

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Psychology(all)

Cite this

Rini, R., & Bruni, T. (2017). Archimedes in the lab: Can science identify good moral reasoning? In Moral Inferences (pp. 155-169). Taylor and Francis. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315675992

Archimedes in the lab : Can science identify good moral reasoning? / Rini, Regina; Bruni, Tommaso.

Moral Inferences. Taylor and Francis, 2017. p. 155-169.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Rini, R & Bruni, T 2017, Archimedes in the lab: Can science identify good moral reasoning? in Moral Inferences. Taylor and Francis, pp. 155-169. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315675992
Rini R, Bruni T. Archimedes in the lab: Can science identify good moral reasoning? In Moral Inferences. Taylor and Francis. 2017. p. 155-169 https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315675992
Rini, Regina ; Bruni, Tommaso. / Archimedes in the lab : Can science identify good moral reasoning?. Moral Inferences. Taylor and Francis, 2017. pp. 155-169
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