Approval voting, Condorcet's principle, and runoff elections

Peter C. Fishburn, Steven Brams

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Approval voting allows each voter to vote for as many candidates as he wishes in an election but not cast more than one vote for each candidate of whom he approves. If there is a strict Condorcet candidate - a candidate who defeats all others in pairwise contests - approval voting is shown to be the only nonranked voting system that is always able to elect the strict Condorcet candidate when voters use sincere admissible strategies. Moreover, if a strict Condorcet candidate must be elected under ordinary plurality voting when voters use admissible strategies, then he must also be elected under approval voting when voters use admissible strategies, but the converse does not hold. The widely used plurality runoff method can also elect a strict Condorcet candidate when voters use admissible strategies on the first ballot, but some of these may have to be insincere to get the strict Condorcet candidate onto the runoff ballot. Furthermore, there is no case in which the strict Condorcet candidate is invariably elected under the plurality runoff method when voters use admissible first-ballot strategies. Thus, approval voting is superior to the plurality runoff method with respect to the Condorcet principle in its ability to elect the strict Condorcet candidate by sincere voting and in its ability to guarantee the election of the strict Condorcet candidate when voters use admissible strategies. In addition, approval voting is more efficient since it requires only one election and is probably less subject to strategic manipulation.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)89-114
    Number of pages26
    JournalPublic Choice
    Volume36
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jan 1981

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    voting
    candidacy
    election
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    Approval voting
    Condorcet
    Elections
    ability
    manipulation
    Voters
    guarantee
    Plurality

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science
    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Approval voting, Condorcet's principle, and runoff elections. / Fishburn, Peter C.; Brams, Steven.

    In: Public Choice, Vol. 36, No. 1, 01.1981, p. 89-114.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Fishburn, Peter C. ; Brams, Steven. / Approval voting, Condorcet's principle, and runoff elections. In: Public Choice. 1981 ; Vol. 36, No. 1. pp. 89-114.
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