Analyses of Cardinal Auctions

Mangesh Gupte, Darja Krushevskaja, Shanmugavelayutham Muthukrishnan

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We study cardinal auctions for selling multiple copies of a good, in which bidders specify not only their bid or how much they are ready to pay for the good, but also a cardinality constraint on the number of copies that will be sold via the auction. We perform first known Price of Anarchy type analyses with detailed comparison of the classical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction and one based on minimum pay property (MPP) which is similar to Generalized Second Price auction commonly used in sponsored search. Without cardinality constraints, MPP has the same efficiency (total value to bidders) and at least as much revenue (total income to the auctioneer) as VCG; this also holds for certain other generalizations of MPP (e.g., prefix constrained auctions, as we show here). In contrast, our main results are that, with cardinality constraints.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)889-903
    Number of pages15
    JournalAlgorithmica
    Volume71
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jan 1 2015

    Fingerprint

    Auctions
    Sales
    Cardinality Constraints
    Price of Anarchy
    Prefix

    Keywords

    • Auction design
    • Efficiency
    • Revenue

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Computer Science(all)
    • Computer Science Applications
    • Applied Mathematics

    Cite this

    Gupte, M., Krushevskaja, D., & Muthukrishnan, S. (2015). Analyses of Cardinal Auctions. Algorithmica, 71(4), 889-903. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-013-9832-x

    Analyses of Cardinal Auctions. / Gupte, Mangesh; Krushevskaja, Darja; Muthukrishnan, Shanmugavelayutham.

    In: Algorithmica, Vol. 71, No. 4, 01.01.2015, p. 889-903.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Gupte, M, Krushevskaja, D & Muthukrishnan, S 2015, 'Analyses of Cardinal Auctions', Algorithmica, vol. 71, no. 4, pp. 889-903. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-013-9832-x
    Gupte M, Krushevskaja D, Muthukrishnan S. Analyses of Cardinal Auctions. Algorithmica. 2015 Jan 1;71(4):889-903. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-013-9832-x
    Gupte, Mangesh ; Krushevskaja, Darja ; Muthukrishnan, Shanmugavelayutham. / Analyses of Cardinal Auctions. In: Algorithmica. 2015 ; Vol. 71, No. 4. pp. 889-903.
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