An institutional explanation of the democratic peace

Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, Alastair Smith

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We examine formally the link between domestic political institutions and policy choices in the context of eight empirical regularities that constitute the democratic peace. We demonstrate that democratic leaders, when faced with war, are more inclined to shift extra resources into the war effort than are autocrats. This follows because the survival of political leaders with larger winning coalitions hinges on successful policy. The extra effort made by democrats provides a military advantage over autocrats. This makes democrats unattractive targets, since their institutional constraints cause them to mobilize resources for the war effort. In addition to trying harder, democrats are more selective in their choice of targets. Because defeat is more likely to lead to domestic replacement for democrats than for autocrats, democrats only initiate wars they expect to win. These two factors lead to the interaction between polities that is often referred to as the democratic peace.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)791-807
    Number of pages17
    JournalAmerican Political Science Review
    Volume93
    Issue number4
    StatePublished - Dec 1999

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    peace
    leader
    political institution
    regularity
    resources
    coalition
    Military
    cause
    interaction

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    Bueno De Mesquita, B., Morrow, J. D., Siverson, R. M., & Smith, A. (1999). An institutional explanation of the democratic peace. American Political Science Review, 93(4), 791-807.

    An institutional explanation of the democratic peace. / Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce; Morrow, James D.; Siverson, Randolph M.; Smith, Alastair.

    In: American Political Science Review, Vol. 93, No. 4, 12.1999, p. 791-807.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Bueno De Mesquita, B, Morrow, JD, Siverson, RM & Smith, A 1999, 'An institutional explanation of the democratic peace', American Political Science Review, vol. 93, no. 4, pp. 791-807.
    Bueno De Mesquita B, Morrow JD, Siverson RM, Smith A. An institutional explanation of the democratic peace. American Political Science Review. 1999 Dec;93(4):791-807.
    Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce ; Morrow, James D. ; Siverson, Randolph M. ; Smith, Alastair. / An institutional explanation of the democratic peace. In: American Political Science Review. 1999 ; Vol. 93, No. 4. pp. 791-807.
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