An experimental study of communication and coordination in noncooperative games

Diego Moreno, John Wooders

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to test the usefulness of alternative solution concepts to explain players' behavior in noncooperative games with preplay communication. In the experiment subjects communicate by plain conversation prior to playing a simple game. In this setting, we find that the presumption of individualistic and independent behavior underlying the concept of Nash equilibrium is inappropriate. Instead, we observe behavior to be coordinated and correlated. Statistical tests reject Nash equilibrium as an explanation of observed play. The coalition proof correlated equilibrium of the game, however, explains the data when the possibility of errors by players is introduced. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)47-76
    Number of pages30
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume24
    Issue number1-2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jan 1 1998

    Fingerprint

    Non-cooperative game
    Experimental study
    Communication
    Nash equilibrium
    Experiment
    Economics
    Solution concepts
    Usefulness
    Correlated equilibrium
    Simple game
    Statistical tests

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Finance
    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    An experimental study of communication and coordination in noncooperative games. / Moreno, Diego; Wooders, John.

    In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 24, No. 1-2, 01.01.1998, p. 47-76.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Moreno, Diego ; Wooders, John. / An experimental study of communication and coordination in noncooperative games. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 1998 ; Vol. 24, No. 1-2. pp. 47-76.
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