An experimental study of communication and coordination in noncooperative games

Diego Moreno, John Wooders

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to test the usefulness of alternative solution concepts to explain players' behavior in noncooperative games with preplay communication. In the experiment subjects communicate by plain conversation prior to playing a simple game. In this setting, we find that the presumption of individualistic and independent behavior underlying the concept of Nash equilibrium is inappropriate. Instead, we observe behavior to be coordinated and correlated. Statistical tests reject Nash equilibrium as an explanation of observed play. The coalition proof correlated equilibrium of the game, however, explains the data when the possibility of errors by players is introduced. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)47-76
Number of pages30
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume24
Issue number1-2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1998

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Non-cooperative game
Experimental study
Communication
Nash equilibrium
Experiment
Usefulness
Solution concepts
Economics
Simple game
Correlated equilibrium
Statistical tests

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

An experimental study of communication and coordination in noncooperative games. / Moreno, Diego; Wooders, John.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 24, No. 1-2, 01.01.1998, p. 47-76.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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