An evolutionary game perspective on quantised consensus in opinion dynamics

Michalis Smyrnakis, Dario Bauso, Tembine Hamidou

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Quantised consensus has been used in the context of opinion dynamics. In this context agents interact with their neighbours and they change their opinion according to their interests and the opinions of their neighbours. We consider various quantised consensus models, where agents have different levels of susceptibility to the inputs received from their neighbours. The provided models share similarities with collective decision making models inspired by honeybees and evolutionary games. As first contribution, we develop an evolutionary game-theoretic model that accommodates the different consensus dynamics in a unified framework. As second contribution, we study equilibrium points and extend such study to the symmetric case where the transition probabilities of the evolutionary game dynamics are symmetric. Symmetry is associated with the case of equally favourable options. As third contribution, we study stability of the equilibrium points for the different cases. We corroborate the theoretical results with some simulations to study the outcomes of the various models.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article numbere0209212
JournalPLoS One
Volume14
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2019

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Consensus
Decision Making
decision support systems
Theoretical Models
Outcome Assessment (Health Care)
honey bees
Decision making

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology(all)
  • Agricultural and Biological Sciences(all)

Cite this

An evolutionary game perspective on quantised consensus in opinion dynamics. / Smyrnakis, Michalis; Bauso, Dario; Hamidou, Tembine.

In: PLoS One, Vol. 14, No. 1, e0209212, 01.01.2019.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Smyrnakis, Michalis ; Bauso, Dario ; Hamidou, Tembine. / An evolutionary game perspective on quantised consensus in opinion dynamics. In: PLoS One. 2019 ; Vol. 14, No. 1.
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