Analyse economique du marche du logement locatif

Translated title of the contribution: An ecoNoMic aNALYsis of the rental housiNG market

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

Abstract

Housing is fully an economic good. Demand and supply factors play first order roles on prices and quantity exchanged. It is also a heavily regulated market. The law, in particular in France, is complex, its execution described by the « Code de procedure civile » is even more complex. In this text, we focus on the rental housing market and attempt to rationalize the existence of such regulations by various market imperfections. In a first part, we describe the lenght of litigation procedures between landlords and tenants. In a second part, we study the consequences of such delays under adverse selection: landlords attempt to screen tenants according to their (exogenous) propensity to sustain the rent. In a third part, we consider moral hazard issues, whereby tenants undertake actions affecting their likelihood of defecting on the rent. We conclude on the need for economists to consider asymmetries of information in urban economics and for law scholars willing to defend the Civil Code of French origine, to investigate where economic inefficiencies lie in.

Original languageFrench
Pages (from-to)1247-1264
Number of pages18
JournalRevue Economique
Volume58
Issue number6
StatePublished - Dec 1 2007

Fingerprint

Economics
Housing market
Rental housing
Economic analysis
Rent
Demand and supply
France
Urban economics
Market imperfections
Inefficiency
Asymmetry of information
Factors
Economists
Adverse selection
Litigation
Propensity
Moral hazard

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Cite this

Analyse economique du marche du logement locatif. / Wasmer, Etienne.

In: Revue Economique, Vol. 58, No. 6, 01.12.2007, p. 1247-1264.

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

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