Alternating-offer bargaining games over the Gaussian interference channel

Xi Liu, Elza Erkip

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

This paper tackles the problem of how two selfish users jointly determine the operating point in the achievable rate region of a two-user Gaussian interference channel through bargaining. In previous work, incentive conditions for two users to cooperate using a simple version of Han-Kobayashi scheme was studied and the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) was used to obtain a fair operating point. Here a noncooperative bargaining game of alternating offers is adopted to model the bargaining process and rates resulting from the equilibrium outcome are analyzed. In particular, it is shown that the operating point resulting from the formulated bargaining game depends on the cost of delay in bargaining and how bargaining proceeds. If the associated bargaining problem is regular, a unique perfect equilibrium exists and lies on the individual rational efficient frontier of the achievable rate region. Besides, the equilibrium outcome approaches the NBS if the bargaining costs of both users are negligible.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2010 48th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2010
Pages775-782
Number of pages8
DOIs
StatePublished - 2010
Event48th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2010 - Monticello, IL, United States
Duration: Sep 29 2010Oct 1 2010

Other

Other48th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2010
CountryUnited States
CityMonticello, IL
Period9/29/1010/1/10

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Control and Systems Engineering

Cite this

Liu, X., & Erkip, E. (2010). Alternating-offer bargaining games over the Gaussian interference channel. In 2010 48th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2010 (pp. 775-782). [5706986] https://doi.org/10.1109/ALLERTON.2010.5706986

Alternating-offer bargaining games over the Gaussian interference channel. / Liu, Xi; Erkip, Elza.

2010 48th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2010. 2010. p. 775-782 5706986.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Liu, X & Erkip, E 2010, Alternating-offer bargaining games over the Gaussian interference channel. in 2010 48th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2010., 5706986, pp. 775-782, 48th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2010, Monticello, IL, United States, 9/29/10. https://doi.org/10.1109/ALLERTON.2010.5706986
Liu X, Erkip E. Alternating-offer bargaining games over the Gaussian interference channel. In 2010 48th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2010. 2010. p. 775-782. 5706986 https://doi.org/10.1109/ALLERTON.2010.5706986
Liu, Xi ; Erkip, Elza. / Alternating-offer bargaining games over the Gaussian interference channel. 2010 48th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2010. 2010. pp. 775-782
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