AIDS policy and psychology: A mechanism-design approach

Andrew Caplin, Kfir Eliaz

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Economic theorists have given little attention to health-related externalities, such as those involved in the spread of AIDS. One reason for this is the critical role played by psychological factors, such as fear of testing, in the continued spread of the disease. We develop a model of AIDS transmission that acknowledges this form of fear. In this context we design a mechanism that not only encourages testing but also slows the spread of the disease through voluntary transmission. Our larger agenda is to demonstrate the power of psychological incentives in the public health arena.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)631-646
    Number of pages16
    JournalRAND Journal of Economics
    Volume34
    Issue number4
    StatePublished - 2003

    Fingerprint

    Mechanism design
    Psychology
    Testing
    Public health
    Psychological factors
    Health
    Incentives
    Agenda
    Economics
    Psychological
    Externalities

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    AIDS policy and psychology : A mechanism-design approach. / Caplin, Andrew; Eliaz, Kfir.

    In: RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 34, No. 4, 2003, p. 631-646.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Caplin, A & Eliaz, K 2003, 'AIDS policy and psychology: A mechanism-design approach', RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 631-646.
    Caplin, Andrew ; Eliaz, Kfir. / AIDS policy and psychology : A mechanism-design approach. In: RAND Journal of Economics. 2003 ; Vol. 34, No. 4. pp. 631-646.
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