Advocacy and political convergence under preference uncertainty

Ernesto Reuben, Christian Traxler, Frans van Winden

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We study the formation of advocacy groups and how they can impact policy outcomes by revealing information about voters[U+05F3] preferences to uninformed political candidates. We conduct a laboratory experiment based on a two-candidate spatial electoral competition setting where the policy preferences of voters are (initially) unknown and change over time. In the control treatment candidates learn about the preferred policy of the median voter through the voting outcome of elections. In the advocacy treatments, voters can organize themselves into advocacy groups in order to reveal their policy preferences. We find that voters often overcome the collective action problem of forming an advocacy group. In fact, we observe the formation of both informative advocacy groups, which convey new information, and uninformative advocacy groups, which do not. Overall, advocacy groups significantly speed up the convergence to the preferred policy of the median voter. However, advocacy does not lead to higher earnings as the gains from faster convergence are offset by the costs of group formation.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)16-36
Number of pages21
JournalEuropean Economic Review
Volume79
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1 2015

Fingerprint

Advocacy
Preference uncertainty
Voters
Median voter
Electoral competition
Collective action
Voting
Elections
Laboratory experiments
Policy impact
Costs
Group formation

Keywords

  • Advocacy groups
  • Information transmission
  • Median voter
  • Political convergence
  • Preference uncertainty
  • Voting

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Advocacy and political convergence under preference uncertainty. / Reuben, Ernesto; Traxler, Christian; van Winden, Frans.

In: European Economic Review, Vol. 79, 01.10.2015, p. 16-36.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Reuben, Ernesto ; Traxler, Christian ; van Winden, Frans. / Advocacy and political convergence under preference uncertainty. In: European Economic Review. 2015 ; Vol. 79. pp. 16-36.
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