Advice and behavior in intergenerational ultimatum games: An experimental approach

Andrew Schotter, Barry Sopher

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    In the real world, when people play a game, they often receive advice from those that have played it before them. Such advice can facilitate the creation of a convention of behavior. This paper studies the impact of advice on the behavior subjects who engage in a non-overlapping generational Ultimatum game where after a subject plays he is replaced by another subject to whom he can offer advice. Our results document the fact that allowing advice fosters the creation of a convention of behavior in Ultimatum games. In addition, by reading the advice offered we conclude that arguments of fairness are rarely used to justify the offers of Senders but are relied upon to justify rejections by Receivers.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)365-393
    Number of pages29
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume58
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Feb 1 2007

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Finance
    • Economics and Econometrics

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