Active firms and active shareholders: Corporate political activity and shareholder proposals

Geeyoung Min, Hye Young You

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    This article reveals the positions of corporations not only as active players in politics but also as targets of activist shareholders with opposing political preferences. We examine whether a firm’s political orientation, as measured by its political spending, serves as a driver of shareholder proposal submissions, one manifestation of shareholder activism. Using data on S&P 500 companies for 1997–2014, we find that the divergence in political orientation between shareholders and corporate management is strongly associated with the number of submissions of shareholder proposals on environmental or social issues. Firms that contribute more to the Republican Party are more likely to be targeted by nonindividual, Democratic-leaning shareholders. This pattern remains even after controlling for firms’ records of corporate social responsibility and labor relations. This finding implies that corporate political spending prompts shareholders with strong political preferences to target firms on the opposite end of the political spectrum.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)81-116
    Number of pages36
    JournalJournal of Legal Studies
    Volume48
    Issue number1
    StatePublished - Jan 1 2019

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    shareholder
    political activity
    firm
    political attitude
    Republican Party
    labor relations
    social responsibility
    social issue
    divergence
    corporation
    driver
    politics
    management

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Law

    Cite this

    Active firms and active shareholders : Corporate political activity and shareholder proposals. / Min, Geeyoung; You, Hye Young.

    In: Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 48, No. 1, 01.01.2019, p. 81-116.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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