A truthful mechanism for offline ad slot scheduling

Jon Feldman, Shanmugavelayutham Muthukrishnan, Evdokia Nikolova, Martin Pál

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Abstract

    We consider the Offline Ad Slot Scheduling problem, where advertisers must be scheduled to sponsored search slots during a given period of time. Advertisers specify a budget constraint, as well as a maximum cost per click, and may not be assigned to more than one slot for a particular search. We give a truthful mechanism under the utility model where bidders try to maximize their clicks, subject to their personal constraints. In addition, we show that the revenue-maximizing mechanism is not truthful, but has a Nash equilibrium whose outcome is identical to our mechanism. Our mechanism employs a descending-price auction that maintains a solution to a certain machine scheduling problem whose job lengths depend on the price, and hence are variable over the auction.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publicationAlgorithmic Game Theory - First International Symposium, SAGT 2008, Proceedings
    Pages182-193
    Number of pages12
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jun 5 2008
    Event1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2008 - Paderborn, Germany
    Duration: Apr 30 2008May 2 2008

    Publication series

    NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
    Volume4997 LNCS
    ISSN (Print)0302-9743
    ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

    Other

    Other1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2008
    CountryGermany
    CityPaderborn
    Period4/30/085/2/08

    Fingerprint

    Scheduling
    Auctions
    Scheduling Problem
    Budget Constraint
    Machine Scheduling
    Period of time
    Nash Equilibrium
    Costs
    Maximise
    Model

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Theoretical Computer Science
    • Computer Science(all)

    Cite this

    Feldman, J., Muthukrishnan, S., Nikolova, E., & Pál, M. (2008). A truthful mechanism for offline ad slot scheduling. In Algorithmic Game Theory - First International Symposium, SAGT 2008, Proceedings (pp. 182-193). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 4997 LNCS). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_17

    A truthful mechanism for offline ad slot scheduling. / Feldman, Jon; Muthukrishnan, Shanmugavelayutham; Nikolova, Evdokia; Pál, Martin.

    Algorithmic Game Theory - First International Symposium, SAGT 2008, Proceedings. 2008. p. 182-193 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 4997 LNCS).

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Feldman, J, Muthukrishnan, S, Nikolova, E & Pál, M 2008, A truthful mechanism for offline ad slot scheduling. in Algorithmic Game Theory - First International Symposium, SAGT 2008, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 4997 LNCS, pp. 182-193, 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2008, Paderborn, Germany, 4/30/08. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_17
    Feldman J, Muthukrishnan S, Nikolova E, Pál M. A truthful mechanism for offline ad slot scheduling. In Algorithmic Game Theory - First International Symposium, SAGT 2008, Proceedings. 2008. p. 182-193. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_17
    Feldman, Jon ; Muthukrishnan, Shanmugavelayutham ; Nikolova, Evdokia ; Pál, Martin. / A truthful mechanism for offline ad slot scheduling. Algorithmic Game Theory - First International Symposium, SAGT 2008, Proceedings. 2008. pp. 182-193 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
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