A truthful auction based incentive framework for femtocell access

Sha Hua, Xuejun Zhuo, Shivendra Panwar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

As cellular operators are suffering from a data explosion problem, and users are consequently experiencing poor data services, the introduction of femtocells offers a cost-effective way to mitigate this problem. Femtocells enable larger network capacity by increasing spatial reuse of the spectrum and shortening the distance to the users. Existing work has shown that open access femtocells, which allow unregistered macro users to connect, are efficient in reducing inter-cell interference and offloading traffic. However, a major obstacle constraining the potential capability of femtocells and open access is the lack of incentives for privately-owned femtocells to serve unregistered users. Hence in this paper, we propose a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction based incentive framework for accessing such selfish femtocells. We consider two scenarios: One scenario involves a single macro user and another scenario has multiple macro users. We design auction schemes for both scenarios and show analytically that our schemes are truthful and have low computational complexity. Extensive simulations validate these properties and show huge performance improvement to the macro users.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2013 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2013
Pages2271-2276
Number of pages6
DOIs
StatePublished - 2013
Event2013 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2013 - Shanghai, China
Duration: Apr 7 2013Apr 10 2013

Other

Other2013 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2013
CountryChina
CityShanghai
Period4/7/134/10/13

Fingerprint

Femtocell
Macros
Explosions
Computational complexity
Costs

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Engineering(all)

Cite this

Hua, S., Zhuo, X., & Panwar, S. (2013). A truthful auction based incentive framework for femtocell access. In 2013 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2013 (pp. 2271-2276). [6554914] https://doi.org/10.1109/WCNC.2013.6554914

A truthful auction based incentive framework for femtocell access. / Hua, Sha; Zhuo, Xuejun; Panwar, Shivendra.

2013 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2013. 2013. p. 2271-2276 6554914.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Hua, S, Zhuo, X & Panwar, S 2013, A truthful auction based incentive framework for femtocell access. in 2013 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2013., 6554914, pp. 2271-2276, 2013 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2013, Shanghai, China, 4/7/13. https://doi.org/10.1109/WCNC.2013.6554914
Hua S, Zhuo X, Panwar S. A truthful auction based incentive framework for femtocell access. In 2013 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2013. 2013. p. 2271-2276. 6554914 https://doi.org/10.1109/WCNC.2013.6554914
Hua, Sha ; Zhuo, Xuejun ; Panwar, Shivendra. / A truthful auction based incentive framework for femtocell access. 2013 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2013. 2013. pp. 2271-2276
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