A theory of wages and labor demand with intra-firm bargaining and matching frictions

Pierre Cahuc, Francois Marque, Etienne Wasmer

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This article provides a model of labor market equilibrium with search and within-firm strategic bargaining. We yield explicit closed form solutions with heterogeneous labor inputs and capital. The solution exhibits overemployment. We show that higher relative bargaining power for some groups of workers may lead to overemployment relative to other groups, with such other groups being underemployed instead if they have a lower relative bargaining power. Similarly, the hold-up problem between capitalists and employees does not necessarily lead to underinvestment in physical capital.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)943-972
Number of pages30
JournalInternational Economic Review
Volume49
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 1 2008

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Matching frictions
Bargaining power
Wages
Labour demand
Workers
Underinvestment
Heterogeneous labor
Employees
Closed-form solution
Market equilibrium
Hold-up problem
Labour market
Physical capital

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

A theory of wages and labor demand with intra-firm bargaining and matching frictions. / Cahuc, Pierre; Marque, Francois; Wasmer, Etienne.

In: International Economic Review, Vol. 49, No. 3, 01.08.2008, p. 943-972.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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