A summary of political selection: The effect of strategic choice on the escalation of international crises

Alastair Smith

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    If we believe that politics involves a significant amount of strategic interaction then classical statistical tests, such as Ordinary Least Squares, Probit or Logit, cannot give us the right answers. This is true for two reasons: the dependent variables under observation are interdependent - that is, the essence of game theoretic logic - and the data is censored - that is, an inherent feature of off the path expectations that leads to selection effects. I explore the consequences of strategic decision-making on empirical estimation in the context of international crisis escalation. Having shown how and why classical estimation techniques fail in strategic settings, I develop a method that ameliorates these problems.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)698-701
    Number of pages4
    JournalAmerican Journal of Political Science
    Volume42
    Issue number2
    StatePublished - Apr 1998

    Fingerprint

    statistical test
    escalation
    estimation procedure
    decision making
    politics
    interaction

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    A summary of political selection : The effect of strategic choice on the escalation of international crises. / Smith, Alastair.

    In: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 42, No. 2, 04.1998, p. 698-701.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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