A study of zero-out auctions: testbed experiments of a process of allocating private rights to the use of public property

Kemal Güler, Charles R. Plott, Quang Vuong

    Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

    Abstract

    This paper applies an experimental testbed methodology to the evaluation of a proposed mechanism for allocating the right to land at the New York airports. The mechanism is called a "zero-out auction" because it is supposed to allocate the rights efficiently like an auction while leaving all of the consumer's surplus with the buyers (as opposed to allocating some to the seller as would be the case with an ordinary auction). A new behavioral hypothesis is introduced to account for limited rationality of individuals and unusual behaviors of the process. The axiom, called the unbiased expectations hypothesis, does a good job of modeling individual behavior in the context of a game model.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)67-104
    Number of pages38
    JournalEconomic Theory
    Volume4
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jan 1994

    Fingerprint

    Experiment
    Auctions
    Axiom
    Seller
    Rationality
    Buyers
    Consumer surplus
    Modeling
    Expectations hypothesis
    Individual behaviour
    Airports
    Experimental methodology
    Evaluation

    Keywords

    • airport slots
    • auctions
    • Experiments
    • landing rights
    • policy

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    A study of zero-out auctions : testbed experiments of a process of allocating private rights to the use of public property. / Güler, Kemal; Plott, Charles R.; Vuong, Quang.

    In: Economic Theory, Vol. 4, No. 1, 01.1994, p. 67-104.

    Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

    Güler, K, Plott, CR & Vuong, Q 1994, 'A study of zero-out auctions: testbed experiments of a process of allocating private rights to the use of public property', Economic Theory, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 67-104. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01211119
    Güler K, Plott CR, Vuong Q. A study of zero-out auctions: testbed experiments of a process of allocating private rights to the use of public property. Economic Theory. 1994 Jan;4(1):67-104. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01211119
    Güler, Kemal ; Plott, Charles R. ; Vuong, Quang. / A study of zero-out auctions : testbed experiments of a process of allocating private rights to the use of public property. In: Economic Theory. 1994 ; Vol. 4, No. 1. pp. 67-104.
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