A simple characterization of approval voting

Carlos Alós-Ferrer

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle


This note provides a characterization of Approval Voting as the only ballot aggregation function satisfying faithfulness, consistency, and cancellation. The proof is simpler than those of the characterizations of Fishburn (Aggregation and revelation of preferences, 1978a; J Econ Theory 19:180-185, 1978b), and also shows that the assumption of Neutrality used there was unnecessary.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)621-625
Number of pages5
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Issue number3
StatePublished - Dec 1 2006


ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

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