A Signaling Theory of Congressional Oversight

Charles M. Cameron, Bryan Rosendorff

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    A take-it-or-leave-it bargaining game with asymmetric information and costly signaling is used to examine Congressional supervision ("oversight") of federal agencies. Hearings signal the resoluteness of the committee-the likelihood that the committee will expend the effort to draft and pass a bill overruling an agency. Two kinds of sequential equilibria exist: a pooling equilibrium, and a set of partial-pooling equilibria in which the receiver is able to distinguish among groups of senders. When the receiver sends its utility-maximizing offer, the sender vetoes with positive probability, and if a compromise offer is sent, it is sent on the assurance of its acceptance. These results resemble patterns in oversight observed in Congress. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 025, 026.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)44-70
    Number of pages27
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume5
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jan 1993

    Fingerprint

    Pooling equilibrium
    Signaling theory
    Oversight
    Acceptance
    Asymmetric information
    Draft
    Bargaining games
    Compromise
    Supervision
    Sequential equilibrium
    Assurance
    Economics

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Finance
    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    A Signaling Theory of Congressional Oversight. / Cameron, Charles M.; Rosendorff, Bryan.

    In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 5, No. 1, 01.1993, p. 44-70.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Cameron, Charles M. ; Rosendorff, Bryan. / A Signaling Theory of Congressional Oversight. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 1993 ; Vol. 5, No. 1. pp. 44-70.
    @article{2ad5769c8cdf46e6938a08884854a1e2,
    title = "A Signaling Theory of Congressional Oversight",
    abstract = "A take-it-or-leave-it bargaining game with asymmetric information and costly signaling is used to examine Congressional supervision ({"}oversight{"}) of federal agencies. Hearings signal the resoluteness of the committee-the likelihood that the committee will expend the effort to draft and pass a bill overruling an agency. Two kinds of sequential equilibria exist: a pooling equilibrium, and a set of partial-pooling equilibria in which the receiver is able to distinguish among groups of senders. When the receiver sends its utility-maximizing offer, the sender vetoes with positive probability, and if a compromise offer is sent, it is sent on the assurance of its acceptance. These results resemble patterns in oversight observed in Congress. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 025, 026.",
    author = "Cameron, {Charles M.} and Bryan Rosendorff",
    year = "1993",
    month = "1",
    doi = "10.1006/game.1993.1003",
    language = "English (US)",
    volume = "5",
    pages = "44--70",
    journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
    issn = "0899-8256",
    publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",
    number = "1",

    }

    TY - JOUR

    T1 - A Signaling Theory of Congressional Oversight

    AU - Cameron, Charles M.

    AU - Rosendorff, Bryan

    PY - 1993/1

    Y1 - 1993/1

    N2 - A take-it-or-leave-it bargaining game with asymmetric information and costly signaling is used to examine Congressional supervision ("oversight") of federal agencies. Hearings signal the resoluteness of the committee-the likelihood that the committee will expend the effort to draft and pass a bill overruling an agency. Two kinds of sequential equilibria exist: a pooling equilibrium, and a set of partial-pooling equilibria in which the receiver is able to distinguish among groups of senders. When the receiver sends its utility-maximizing offer, the sender vetoes with positive probability, and if a compromise offer is sent, it is sent on the assurance of its acceptance. These results resemble patterns in oversight observed in Congress. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 025, 026.

    AB - A take-it-or-leave-it bargaining game with asymmetric information and costly signaling is used to examine Congressional supervision ("oversight") of federal agencies. Hearings signal the resoluteness of the committee-the likelihood that the committee will expend the effort to draft and pass a bill overruling an agency. Two kinds of sequential equilibria exist: a pooling equilibrium, and a set of partial-pooling equilibria in which the receiver is able to distinguish among groups of senders. When the receiver sends its utility-maximizing offer, the sender vetoes with positive probability, and if a compromise offer is sent, it is sent on the assurance of its acceptance. These results resemble patterns in oversight observed in Congress. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 025, 026.

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0038363016&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0038363016&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    U2 - 10.1006/game.1993.1003

    DO - 10.1006/game.1993.1003

    M3 - Article

    VL - 5

    SP - 44

    EP - 70

    JO - Games and Economic Behavior

    JF - Games and Economic Behavior

    SN - 0899-8256

    IS - 1

    ER -