### Abstract

In this work a four terminal Gaussian network composed of a source, a destination, an eavesdropper and a jammer relay is studied. The jammer relay does not hear the source transmission. It assists the eavesdropper and aims to decrease the achievable secrecy rates. The source, on the other hand, aims to increase the achievable secrecy rates. Assuming Gaussian strategies at the source and the jammer relay, this problem is formulated as a two-player zero-sum continuous game, where the payoff is the achieved secrecy rate. For this game the Nash Equilibrium is generally achieved with mixed strategies. The optimal cumulative distribution functions for the source and the jammer relay that achieve the value of the game, which is the equilibrium secrecy rate, are found.

Original language | English (US) |
---|---|

Title of host publication | 2009 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2009 |

Pages | 110-114 |

Number of pages | 5 |

DOIs | |

State | Published - Dec 7 2009 |

Event | 2009 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2009 - Taormina, Sicily, Italy Duration: Oct 11 2009 → Oct 16 2009 |

### Other

Other | 2009 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2009 |
---|---|

Country | Italy |

City | Taormina, Sicily |

Period | 10/11/09 → 10/16/09 |

### Fingerprint

### ASJC Scopus subject areas

- Computational Theory and Mathematics
- Computer Networks and Communications
- Information Systems
- Electrical and Electronic Engineering

### Cite this

*2009 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2009*(pp. 110-114). [5351368] https://doi.org/10.1109/ITW.2009.5351368

**A secure communication game with a relay helping the eavesdropper.** / Yuksel, Melda; Liu, Xi; Erkip, Elza.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

*2009 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2009.*, 5351368, pp. 110-114, 2009 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2009, Taormina, Sicily, Italy, 10/11/09. https://doi.org/10.1109/ITW.2009.5351368

}

TY - GEN

T1 - A secure communication game with a relay helping the eavesdropper

AU - Yuksel, Melda

AU - Liu, Xi

AU - Erkip, Elza

PY - 2009/12/7

Y1 - 2009/12/7

N2 - In this work a four terminal Gaussian network composed of a source, a destination, an eavesdropper and a jammer relay is studied. The jammer relay does not hear the source transmission. It assists the eavesdropper and aims to decrease the achievable secrecy rates. The source, on the other hand, aims to increase the achievable secrecy rates. Assuming Gaussian strategies at the source and the jammer relay, this problem is formulated as a two-player zero-sum continuous game, where the payoff is the achieved secrecy rate. For this game the Nash Equilibrium is generally achieved with mixed strategies. The optimal cumulative distribution functions for the source and the jammer relay that achieve the value of the game, which is the equilibrium secrecy rate, are found.

AB - In this work a four terminal Gaussian network composed of a source, a destination, an eavesdropper and a jammer relay is studied. The jammer relay does not hear the source transmission. It assists the eavesdropper and aims to decrease the achievable secrecy rates. The source, on the other hand, aims to increase the achievable secrecy rates. Assuming Gaussian strategies at the source and the jammer relay, this problem is formulated as a two-player zero-sum continuous game, where the payoff is the achieved secrecy rate. For this game the Nash Equilibrium is generally achieved with mixed strategies. The optimal cumulative distribution functions for the source and the jammer relay that achieve the value of the game, which is the equilibrium secrecy rate, are found.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=76249124606&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=76249124606&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1109/ITW.2009.5351368

DO - 10.1109/ITW.2009.5351368

M3 - Conference contribution

SN - 9781424449835

SP - 110

EP - 114

BT - 2009 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2009

ER -