A secure communication game with a relay helping the eavesdropper

Melda Yuksel, Xi Liu, Elza Erkip

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

In this work a four terminal Gaussian network composed of a source, a destination, an eavesdropper and a jammer relay is studied. The jammer relay does not hear the source transmission. It assists the eavesdropper and aims to decrease the achievable secrecy rates. The source, on the other hand, aims to increase the achievable secrecy rates. Assuming Gaussian strategies at the source and the jammer relay, this problem is formulated as a two-player zero-sum continuous game, where the payoff is the achieved secrecy rate. For this game the Nash Equilibrium is generally achieved with mixed strategies. The optimal cumulative distribution functions for the source and the jammer relay that achieve the value of the game, which is the equilibrium secrecy rate, are found.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2009 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2009
Pages110-114
Number of pages5
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 7 2009
Event2009 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2009 - Taormina, Sicily, Italy
Duration: Oct 11 2009Oct 16 2009

Other

Other2009 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2009
CountryItaly
CityTaormina, Sicily
Period10/11/0910/16/09

Fingerprint

Distribution functions
Secure communication

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computational Theory and Mathematics
  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Information Systems
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Yuksel, M., Liu, X., & Erkip, E. (2009). A secure communication game with a relay helping the eavesdropper. In 2009 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2009 (pp. 110-114). [5351368] https://doi.org/10.1109/ITW.2009.5351368

A secure communication game with a relay helping the eavesdropper. / Yuksel, Melda; Liu, Xi; Erkip, Elza.

2009 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2009. 2009. p. 110-114 5351368.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Yuksel, M, Liu, X & Erkip, E 2009, A secure communication game with a relay helping the eavesdropper. in 2009 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2009., 5351368, pp. 110-114, 2009 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2009, Taormina, Sicily, Italy, 10/11/09. https://doi.org/10.1109/ITW.2009.5351368
Yuksel M, Liu X, Erkip E. A secure communication game with a relay helping the eavesdropper. In 2009 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2009. 2009. p. 110-114. 5351368 https://doi.org/10.1109/ITW.2009.5351368
Yuksel, Melda ; Liu, Xi ; Erkip, Elza. / A secure communication game with a relay helping the eavesdropper. 2009 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2009. 2009. pp. 110-114
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